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Acquiring Innovation
Abstract

In recent years, the innovation market has witnessed a new business model involving companies that are mere
patent holding shells and not operating entities. They have no customers or products to offer, but they do have
an aggressive tactic of using patent portfolios to threaten other operating companies with potential
infringement litigation. The strategy is executed with the end goal of extracting handsome settlements.
Acquisitions of patents for offensive use have become a major concern to operating companies because such
acquisitions pose the threats of patent injunction, interrupting the business and crippling further innovation.
While many operating companies today know that innovation is the cornerstone of the technology and
information based economy, not many companies today self-develop every segment of their end products or
services. If a company cannot self-develop certain innovations, it can acquire the innovations. Purchases,
transfers, and licenses of technology are common occurrences, which allow companies to achieve maximum
results. Companies acquire innovations to supplement their research and development and ultimately
strengthen their presence in the marketplace. Companies often turn to startups and young entities to acquire
these supplemental innovations, generally in the form of promising intellectual property portfolios. As
segmentation of the innovation market expands, acquiring innovations is part of many companies' strategic
plan. For example, Intel acquired Oplus Technologies in early 2005 for Oplus's advanced video processing
technology and then acquired Zarlink in late 2005 for its demodulation and tuner technologies. Intel used
these combined technologies to complement Intel's core microprocessor technology, enhancing Intel's ability
to control the consumer electronic market. Likewise, Boston Scientific acquired EndoTex Interventional
Systems, Inc. for its NexStent Carotid Stent. This acquisition potentially provides Boston Scientific with the
opportunity to incorporate the NexStent Carotid Stent into Boston Scientific's portfolio of available carotid
artery products so it can expand its market. These examples beg the questions of how tax law currently treats
innovation acquisition costs and whether that treatment stimulates further innovations vis-à-vis encouraging
acquisitions of innovations to occur. As a widely accepted principle of taxation, any expenditure that produces
a benefit lasting beyond the current tax period should be capitalized. Under current tax policy, the costs of
innovation development are not subject to this general capitalization principle, but can be deducted when
incurred. In contrast, the costs of innovation acquisitions are subject to normative capitalization, as well as a
host of irrational tax depreciation rules that differ depending on method of innovation protection, manner of
procurement, and even method of payment. This Article explores whether exceptions from assetcapitalization and rational tax depreciation rules are justified to reflect the realities of today's segmentation of
the innovation market. The authors argue that the federal tax subsidy for innovation should not be limited to
initial research, but should be expanded to cover desirable acquisitions in order to achieve optimal innovation
outcomes and enhanced economic growth. This Article further explores accelerated tax incentives for
innovations purchased for further development or licensing purposes. The addition of adequate economic
incentives for select innovation acquisitions would reflect the realities of today's segmentation of innovation
and serve to encourage a robust acquisition market. Part I focuses on innovation development and the
marketplace, discussing the increasing segmentation of the innovation market where startups and universities
fill a special niche for major corporations and industries by serving as the incubation centers for ideas.
Different methods of acquiring innovations and the available legal protection for innovations are explained to
illustrate the dynamics of the marketplace. Part II reveals that licensing of innovations post-development and
acquisition serves as the new model of business, representing a paradigm shift in business models. Both
defensive and offensive uses of innovation are developing as the new mode of practice today. Part III illustrates
flaws with the current federal tax regime governing innovations, namely its focus solely on the development
market and its resulting failure to adequately incentivize desirable acquisitions of innovation. Part IV explores
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accelerated tax incentives for innovation acquisitions. One option explored is immediate expensing of limited
innovation acquisition costs. Expensing would stimulate technological development, eliminate high
administrative costs, and reduce harm caused by current irrational tax depreciation rules. Another option
explored is an accelerated tax depreciation system for otherwise capitalized innovation acquisition costs. An
accelerated depreciation system that takes into account retirement and revenue risks of innovation would
serve to encourage desirable innovation acquisitions and reduce administrative costs for taxpayers and the
government. So as not to negatively hinder innovation, both options are recommended for innovations
acquired for further development or licensing purposes, but not for innovations acquired for offensive uses.
The Article concludes that the proposed options would encourage acquisitions of innovation for societal good
and achieve tax policy goals such as efficiency and administrability.
Keywords

Intellectual Property, Patents, Tax, Tax Policy, TI, IBM, Innovation, Technology, Patent Reform, License,
Licensing
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the innovation market has witnessed a new business
model involving companies that are mere patent holding shells and
not operating entities. They have no customers or products to offer,
but they do have an aggressive tactic of using patent portfolios to
threaten other operating companies with potential infringement
1
litigation. The strategy is executed with the end goal of extracting
2
handsome settlements. Acquisitions of patents for offensive use have
become a major concern to operating companies because such
acquisitions pose the threats of patent injunction, interrupting the
3
business and crippling further innovation.
While many operating companies today know that innovation is the
4
cornerstone of the technology and information based economy, not
1. See Joe Beyers, Perspective: Rise of the Patent Trolls, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 12,
2005, http://news.com.com/Rise+of+the+patent+trolls/2010-1071_3-5892996.html
(noting that after the dot-com bust, “a new kind of business with a simple, yet
potentially lethal, model has emerged,” where companies have no products or
customers, but “wield the power to bring the companies that actually make and sell
products to their knees”).
2. See generally Maggie Shiels, Technology Industry Hits Out At ‘Patent Trolls,’ BBC
NEWS, June 2, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3722509.stm (reporting
the extortion tactics employed by a patent holding company to extract settlement
from various operating companies); Underdog or Patent Troll?, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr.
24, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_17/b3981070.htm
(noting that the patent holding companies’ business plan “consists of cashing in on
this intellectual property by suing traditional corporations, the types that produce
real products”).
3. Shiels, supra note 2 (quoting FTC Commissioner Mozelle Thompson’s
statement about the negative effects of patent trolls: “But we have seen instances
where companies use that monopoly in an anti-competitive way, sometimes to
prevent other products from getting to market, to prevent people from sharing ideas
and to prevent the kind of innovation that the patent system is really trying to spur
on”).
4. See JULIE A. HEDLUND, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
FOUNDATION, PATENTS PENDING: PATENT REFORM FOR THE INNOVATION ECONOMY 1
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many companies today self-develop every segment of their end
5
products or services. If a company cannot self-develop certain
6
innovations, it can acquire the innovations. Purchases, transfers, and
licenses of technology are common occurrences, which allow
companies to achieve maximum results. Companies acquire
innovations to supplement their research and development and
7
ultimately strengthen their presence in the marketplace. Companies
often turn to startups and young entities to acquire these
supplemental innovations, generally in the form of promising
8
intellectual property portfolios.
As segmentation of the innovation market expands, acquiring
innovations is part of many companies’ strategic plan. For example,
Intel acquired Oplus Technologies in early 2005 for Oplus’s
advanced video processing technology and then acquired Zarlink in
9
late 2005 for its demodulation and tuner technologies. Intel used
these combined technologies to complement Intel’s core
microprocessor technology, enhancing Intel’s ability to control the
10
consumer electronic market. Likewise, Boston Scientific acquired

(2007), http://www.itif.org/files/PatentsPending.pdf (“[T]he U.S. patent system
provides key economic incentives that spur innovation by giving patent owners a
temporary property right to their inventions while at the same time requiring them
to disclose their patents to the public.”).
5. See Stephen Shankland, Sun Balances Acquisition, Innovation, CNET
NEWS.COM, Feb. 26, 2003, http://news.com.com/2100-1001-986194.html (reporting
that even companies like Sun, known to be an innovator, now look to outsiders for
innovations to make its products in order to stay competitive, and noting that Sun’s
archrival Microsoft has been known to expand its technology portfolios through
acquisitions).
6. See Microsoft, Press Pass, Q&A: Navision Executives See Global Solutions,
Innovation Stemming from Acquisition by Microsoft, July 11, 2002, http://www.micr
osoft.com/presspass/features/2002/jul02/07-11navisionqa.mspx (reporting that
Microsoft acquired Navision for $1.45 billion for its innovation and that the two
software companies “join[ed] forces to further the vision of an interconnected
marketplace for small- and medium-sized businesses”); Knowledge@Wharton, Does
Innovation Through Acquisition Work?, FORBES.COM, Nov. 8, 2005, http://www.forbes.co
m/entrepreneurs/2005/11/08/microsoft-nortel-acquisitions-cx_1108wharton.html
[hereinafter Knowledge@Wharton] (reporting that companies spent $3.5 trillion on
acquisition between 1992 and 2000 and that acquirer companies face “challenges at
the product, organization and market levels”).
7. See Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 6 (commenting that companies that
buy other companies rooted in different technology can gain “new technological
functionalities and capabilities” if the purchasing companies can successfully
integrate the acquired innovations with their existing innovations).
8. See id. (stating that top companies acquired smaller firms with budding,
though untested, technology to keep up with technological advancements).
9. See Press Release, Intel, Intel Announces Agreement to Acquire Digital
Broadcast Technology Assets, Expertise From Zarlink Semiconductor (Oct. 7, 2005),
http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/20051007corp.htm.
10. See id. (noting that Intel’s acquisition of Oplus and Zarlink technologies
provide Intel with a greater opportunity to “deliver innovative platform solutions”).
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EndoTex Interventional Systems, Inc. for its NexStent Carotid Stent.
This acquisition potentially provides Boston Scientific with the
opportunity to incorporate the NexStent Carotid Stent into Boston
Scientific’s portfolio of available carotid artery products so it can
12
expand its market. These examples beg the questions of how tax
law currently treats innovation acquisition costs and whether that
treatment stimulates further innovations vis-à-vis encouraging
acquisitions of innovations to occur.
As a widely accepted principle of taxation, any expenditure that
produces a benefit lasting beyond the current tax period should be
13
capitalized.
Under current tax policy, the costs of innovation
development are not subject to this general capitalization principle,
14
but can be deducted when incurred.
In contrast, the costs of
innovation acquisitions are subject to normative capitalization, as well
as a host of irrational tax depreciation rules that differ depending on
method of innovation protection, manner of procurement, and even
15
method of payment.
This Article explores whether exceptions from asset-capitalization
and rational tax depreciation rules are justified to reflect the realities
of today’s segmentation of the innovation market. The authors argue
that the federal tax subsidy for innovation should not be limited to
initial research, but should be expanded to cover desirable
acquisitions in order to achieve optimal innovation outcomes and
enhanced economic growth.
This Article further explores
accelerated tax incentives for innovations purchased for further
development or licensing purposes. The addition of adequate
11. See Press Release, Boston Scientific, Boston Scientific Acquires EndoTex
Interventional Systems, Inc. (Jan. 4, 2007), http://bostonscientific.mediaroom.com
/index.php?s=43&item=604 (announcing its acquisition of EndoTex Interventional
Systems, Inc., a privately held development stage medical device company focused on
a less-invasive solution to treating carotid artery disease).
12. Id.
13. See generally Ethan Yale, When are Capitalization Exceptions Justified?, 57 TAX L.
REV. 549 (2004) (discussing when exceptions to the requirement that expenditures
producing long-lasting benefits should be capitalized are justified).
14. See infra notes 102–105, 114–121 and accompanying text (describing the
current treatment of innovation development costs). Section 174 of the Internal
Revenue Code (“Code”) permits a taxpayer to deduct immediately research or
experimental expenditures that would otherwise have to be capitalized under § 263.
See I.R.C. § 174(a); see also § 263(a)(1)(B) (providing that the capitalization rules
under § 263(a) do not apply to research or experimental expenditures deductible
under § 174(a)). See generally JEFFREY A. MAINE & XUAN-THAO N. NGUYEN,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TAXATION: TRANSACTION AND LITIGATION ISSUES 132–56
(BNA 2003) (explaining § 174 in depth). Unless otherwise noted, all references to
the Internal Revenue Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
15. See infra notes 129–176 and accompanying text (detailing the current
treatment of innovation acquisition costs).
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economic incentives for select innovation acquisitions would reflect
the realities of today’s segmentation of innovation and serve to
encourage a robust acquisition market.
Part I focuses on innovation development and the marketplace,
discussing the increasing segmentation of the innovation market
where startups and universities fill a special niche for major
corporations and industries by serving as the incubation centers for
ideas. Different methods of acquiring innovations and the available
legal protection for innovations are explained to illustrate the
dynamics of the marketplace.
Part II reveals that licensing of innovations post-development and
acquisition serves as the new model of business, representing a
paradigm shift in business models. Both defensive and offensive uses
of innovation are developing as the new mode of practice today.
Part III illustrates flaws with the current federal tax regime
governing innovations, namely its focus solely on the development
market and its resulting failure to adequately incentivize desirable
acquisitions of innovation.
Part IV explores accelerated tax incentives for innovation
acquisitions. One option explored is immediate expensing of limited
innovation acquisition costs.
Expensing would stimulate
technological development, eliminate high administrative costs, and
reduce harm caused by current irrational tax depreciation rules.
Another option explored is an accelerated tax depreciation system
for otherwise capitalized innovation acquisition costs. An accelerated
depreciation system that takes into account retirement and revenue
risks of innovation would serve to encourage desirable innovation
acquisitions and reduce administrative costs for taxpayers and the
government. So as not to negatively hinder innovation, both options
are recommended for innovations acquired for further development
or licensing purposes, but not for innovations acquired for offensive
uses. The Article concludes that the proposed options would
encourage acquisitions of innovation for societal good and achieve
tax policy goals such as efficiency and administrability.
I.

INNOVATION DEVELOPMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE

If a company cannot self-develop certain innovations, it looks to
others to acquire the innovations. Reasons for not developing the
innovations in-house may include cost, expertise, facility restrictions,
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16

and personnel concerns. Generally, companies acquire innovation
for purposes of further development and production of products and
services with the desire to expand or capture additional market
17
shares.
A company desiring to acquire innovations developed by outsiders
can attempt to purchase innovative portfolios comprised of trade
18
secrets, software, patent applications, and patents. The company
may choose to purchase only the innovations, without the attached
19
ongoing business concern, if there is a willing seller. By conducting
an asset purchase alone, the company avoids the acquisition of the
target company’s ongoing concerns and liabilities. Alternatively, the
company may conduct a stock purchase by acquiring startup entities
20
that are developing innovative technologies. Great innovations are
also developed by established entities, thus, the company can acquire
21
the innovations by acquiring the established corporation.
16. See Jonathan Thaw, Writely Puts Google in Word-Processing Business, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 10, 2006, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/262443
_googlewritely10.html (reporting Google’s recent acquisition of a Silicon Valley
upstart company, Upstartle, for its “Writely Internet word-processing software and a
new weapon in its battle with Microsoft Corp”).
17. See, e.g., Ben Elgin, Google Buys Android for Its Mobile Arsenal, BUSINESS WEEK,
Aug. 17, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2005/tc2005
0817_0949_tc024.htm (stating that Google acquired the twenty-two month-old
startup for its technology in “developing smarter mobile devices that are more aware
of its owner’s location and preferences”); Microsoft Buys Motionbridge, REDHERRING,
Feb. 13, 2006, http://www.redherring.com/Home/15713 (reporting the acquisition
by Microsoft of Motionbridge in early 2006 for “its wireless search capabilities” to add
“to the Redmond software giant as it attempts to broaden the range of services it can
deliver over the Internet and over wireless connections as well,” and to give Microsoft
access to MotionBridge’s ninety million subscribers).
18. See Microsoft Buys Motionbridge, supra note 17 (reporting that MotionBridge
has several patent applications in its technology portfolio).
19. See Technology Briefing/E-commerce: Broadcom Buys Patents from Unova, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2002, at C3 (reporting that Broadcom, the biggest maker of
semiconductors used in cable modems, bought about 150 patents and patent
applications from Unova for $24 million in cash on December 26, 2002); ADM Buys
Patents to Boost Cholesterol Lowering, NUTRAINGREDIENTS-USA.COM, July 16, 2005,
http://www.nutraingredients-usa.com/news-by-product/news.asp?id=61430&idCat=8
9&k=ADM-patent-soy (reporting that ADM acquired “the intellectual property from
rival Solae, adding them to the package of patents on soy isoflavones that it acquired
from the firm earlier this year”).
20. See, e.g., David Shook, Rosetta Inphamartics: Translating Genes Into Profits,
BUSINESS WEEK, June 21, 2001, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jun2
001/nf20010621_887.htm (analyzing Merck’s acquisition of Rosetta, a startup
pioneer company in genomics); Ucilia Wang, TI to Buy Chipcon for $200M,
REDHERRING, Dec. 20, 2005, http://www.redherring.com/Home/14980 (reporting
Texas Instruments’ purchase of Chipcon, a Norwegian company, for $200 million to
“boost TI’s expertise in designing short-range wireless chips for consumer electronics
and security systems”).
21. See, e.g., Press Release, IBM, IBM Acquires DataPower (Oct. 18, 2005),
http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/7934.wss
(announcing IBM’s
purchase of DataPower, a leading provider of SOA appliance products, to enable
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A. Innovations and Protections
Holders of innovations generally seek protection for their
22
innovations. The incentive-based legal protection for innovations
grants the holders the right to exclude others from using and
practicing the innovations as long as the innovations meet certain
legal requirements.
23
Patent and trade secret laws extend protection to innovations.
Under patent law, the innovation is entitled to patent protection if
the innovation satisfies patentability requirements such as patentable
24
subject matter, utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and enablement.
The patentee enjoys the patent monopoly for a term of twenty years
25
from the date on which the patent application was filed.
In
exchange for the monopoly, the innovation is fully disclosed to the
26
public. The holder of the innovation, in some instances, may not
wish to disclose the innovation and prefers to maintain the secrecy of
the innovation by implementing various safeguarding procedures
while using the innovation during the operation of the company or

integration and help provide security at the Web services message level, and to
“improve the performance, security and management of business processes built of
reusable, open-standards-based software components, which operate independently
from the applications and computing platforms on which they run”); Press Release,
Intel, Intel Acquires Sarvega to Bolster Software, Enterprise Platform Strategies (Aug.
17, 2005), http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/20050817corp.htm
(announcing that Intel acquired Sarvega, Inc., a leader in XML solutions, for the
purpose of combining “Intel’s proven hardware capabilities with Sarvega’s
underlying XML software technology and engineering expertise”).
22. See generally Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetime, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 269, 270 (2006) (commenting that patents are “flagship
vehicles” for protecting innovation and providing innovation and financial
incentives). Startup companies in particular frequently seek to obtain patent
protection for their innovations and sue industry giants for patent infringement. See
Matthew Fordahl, Mobil E-mail Startup Sues Microsoft, USA TODAY, Dec. 15, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/business/2005-12-15-microsoft-vist
o-suit_x.htm (reporting that a mobile e-mail startup, Visto Corp., sued Microsoft for
allegedly infringing on three of its patents “related to how information is handled
between servers and handheld devices such as cellular phones”).
23. See Julie Manning Magid, Anthony D. Cox & Dena S. Cox, Qualifying Brand
Image: Empirical Evidence of Trademark Dilution, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 7 (2006) (asserting
that high-tech companies preserve their competitive advantage by seeking patent
protection for their innovations).
24. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2000); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon
Parchomovsky, A Market for Ideas?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 395, 426–27 (2005) (positing that
in addition to the requirements of novelty, utility and nonobviousness, a new
requirement of developability should be considered in screening which ideas are
worthy of patent protection).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
26. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 150–
51 (2006) (arguing that the disclosure obligation is concerned more with the
inventor’s actual scope of invention and the right to exclude).
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the manufacturing of products based on the innovation. In the
latter scenario, the holder of the innovation looks to trade secret law
for protection.
Under trade secret law, the holder enjoys trade secret protection
28
for the innovation, as long as the innovation is kept secret. The
29
term of protection lasts as long as the secrecy is maintained. Many
innovations fail to meet the patentability requirements, but satisfy the
trade secret law requirements and, hence, are entitled to trade secret
30
protection. In those cases, the holder of innovation will not seek
patent protection, but instead rely on trade secret law for the
31
protection of the innovation. Still, it is common that the holder of
innovations seeks both patent and trade secret protection for its
32
innovations.
Holders of innovations in software also appeal to copyright law for
33
protection, in addition to trade secret and patent laws. Though the
scope of copyright protection for software has been narrowed by the
34
courts in recent years, holders continue to assert copyright
27. See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 105–06, 108–13 (2004) (explaining the
“incentive to invent” and “incentive to disclose” theories of patents and concluding
that trade secret protection, rather than patent, sufficiently encourages primary
invention for non-self disclosing inventions when the expected trade secret return is
greater than the “extra income needed to recoup the appropriate investment in
developing and commercializing the invention”).
28. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 275–76 (comparing legal protection for
innovations under the trade secrets regime to the patent regime).
29. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) (noting that a
trade secret must not be of public knowledge or of general knowledge in the trade or
business, and does not lose secrecy when the holder reveals it to another despite
having an obligation not to disclose).
30. See id. at 488–89 (explaining trade secret protection for non-patentable
inventions).
31. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 281 (commenting that trade secret protection
provides incentives, in terms of scope of subject matter and cost, for many
innovations that do not meet the requirements for a patent).
32. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 264–65 (1998) (referencing an argument made by
other scholars that trade secret law provides “a useful supplement to patent law
because it allows inventors to internalize more of the social benefit of their
inventions”).
33. See generally Bradford L. Smith & Susan O. Mann, Innovation and Intellectual
Property Protection in the Software Industry: An Emerging Role for Patents?, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 241 (2004) (explaining that the development of intellectual property protection
regimes for software has moved from trade secrets to copyrights then to patents).
34. See Lateef Mtima, Protecting Non-Literal Elements of Computer Programs:
Comparing the Approaches of Whelan and Altai, SC71 ALI-ABA 133 (1998) (analyzing
Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), and Computer
Assoc. Intl, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 1997), two seminal cases on
copyright protection for computer programs, and explaining how the Second Circuit
in Altai considers the “purpose equals idea” equation developed by the Whelan court
overbroad).
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35

protection for software innovations. If the software is qualified for
copyright protection, the date of protection begins on the date the
36
There is no need to register copyrightable
software is created.
software with the U.S. Copyright Office in order to receive copyright
37
protection.
In addition, both criminal and civil copyright
infringement actions are available against defendants for wholesale
copying and distribution of copyrighted software without
38
authorization.
The duration for copyright protection is quite
long—the life of the author of the copyright software plus seventy
39
years. If the software is a work for hire, the duration is ninety-five
years from the year of publication or 125 years from the year of
40
creation, whichever expires first.
Taking advantage of the incentive-based legal protections for
innovations, holders can create and maintain attractive portfolios of
intellectual property assets. The quality and quantity of the portfolios
will impress outsiders including competitors, investors, and
41
acquirers.
35. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1254 (3d Cir. 1983) (opining that courts usually find the requisite irreparable harm
for a preliminary injunction in copyright infringement actions if the defendant
engages in software piracy by making wholesale copies of the software without
authorization). Developers of software make their decision among the competing
legal regimes for protection of software. They may rely on copyright protection that
exposes the secrecy of their creativity, or they may maintain the secrecy of the
innovation and forgo mass marketing and appeal to trade secret law for protection.
See generally James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 177–
78, 211–12 (2005).
36. Gibson, supra note 35, at 225.
37. See Judith A. Szepesi, Maximizing Protection for Computer Software, 12 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 173, 188 (1996) (stating that registration is not
required for receiving copyright protection, but is a prerequisite for filing suit in
federal court).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2006); Wall
Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t., 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000) (mandating criminal punishment for violations of a copyright
for any person who willfully infringes a copyright “for purposes of commercial
advantage or private financial gain” and “by the reproduction or distribution,
including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or
phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of
more than $1,000”).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (“Copyright in a work created on or after
January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following
subsections, endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after
the author’s death.”).
40. See id. § 302(c) (“In the case of . . . a work made for hire, the copyright
endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120
years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first.”).
41. See Holbrook, supra note 26, at 149 (providing a succinct summary of patent
signaling theory).
The patent is to act as a signal to the market, not to technologists. What the
market wants to know is whether the firm has something of value or is
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B. Startup Acquisition
Acquiring new innovations can be accomplished through the
acquisition of the startup company that holds the innovations. Most
large corporations cannot develop all innovations that contribute to
42
commercially ready products and services. Innovations often occur
at small companies and universities. As the innovation market
becomes increasingly segmented, startups and small companies
emerge to fill the “gaps” of innovation for big companies and one
43
another.
The value of a startup company is often dependent on its patent
44
portfolios. Many startups are the direct result of the Bayh-Dole Act,
enacted in the 1980s, which permits universities to obtain patents for
45
the innovations. Even though universities receive funding from the
government for a wide range of their research activities, such funding
46
does not prohibit universities from becoming patent holders. As
inventors, university researchers work with various industries and
innovative. At the root, then, of signaling theory is an attempt by the firm to
disclose what it possesses through low cost mechanisms so that investors will
commit financial resources. The patent may also signal the direction the
firm intends to follow, but the signal’s audience is actually concerned with
the patent’s potential reward in terms of return rather than with that
disclosure’s technical details. The market wants to know what the firm
possesses; it does not want to learn from or improve upon what the firm has
created. The use of an enabling disclosure to demonstrate possession is thus
entirely consistent with and supportive of signaling theory.
Id.
42. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2005) (asserting that larger companies seek to compile related patents into
a “patent portfolio” that will increase the “scale and diversity of available marketplace
protections for innovations”).
43. Id. at 10.
44. See Richard S. Gruner, Corporate Patents: Optimizing Organizational Responses to
Innovation Opportunities and Invention Discoveries, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 11
(2006) (asserting that startup companies need patents to draw in potential investors
who have many investment alternatives and prefer the risk containment that patents
offer); cf. Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83
TEX. L. REV. 961, 963–64 (2005) (answering in the negative that patents alone do not
help small firms, particularly in the pre-revenue stage).
45. See Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix:
A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV.
303, 431–32 (2002) (quoting Leon Rosenburg, former Dean of Yale University
School of Medicine, who stated that, since the 1980s, biotechnology has “‘moved us,
literally or figuratively, from the class room to the board room and from the New
England Journal [of Medicine] to the Wall Street Journal’”). The escalating growth
of patent procurements by universities is the direct result of their partnership with
industry. Prominent university researchers are now working with or consulting for
private companies. Id. at 432–33.
46. See id. at 433 (arguing that “[w]hen an academic researcher publicly reveals a
new discovery, not only does the public benefit from the increase in general
knowledge, but something else important happens. The university has precluded
any commercial enterprise from patenting and, thus, monopolizing the discovery”).
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startups that often receive the exclusive license to the patents owned
by universities. Prior to the Act, universities could not seek
ownership of patents in their names. Consequently, universities were
handicapped in their efforts to engage in the licensing of innovations
47
and joint collaborative efforts with private industries.
University researchers today often devote their expertise to work
with startup companies to rapidly transform innovations to products
48
and services for commercial exploitation.
Numerous examples
49
illustrate such transformations. For instance, two Stanford students
worked on a project funded by the National Science Foundation
(“NSF”) on digital libraries and then used the innovation to create
50
Another example is how
the Google search engine company.
Netscape began; the software package was written by a research
51
student at the University of Illinois, with funding from NSF.
C. The Innovations Only Acquisition
A company seeking to purchase only technology developed by
others can acquire the intellectual property rights directly from the
52
holders.
By purchasing only the innovations, the acquiring
47. See Nusrat Khaleeli & Dennis Fernandez, Patent Prosecution in
Pharmacogenomics, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 83, 84 (2006) (explaining that
the Bayh-Dole Act permits the government to transfer ownership of many
government funded inventions to universities, which has resulted in the licensing of
half of the university-born patents).
48. See Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents
in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 228–29 (2006) (noting the changing role of
university faculty as inventors for startup companies).
49. See Shira Boss-Bicak, Moving Ideas Off Campus: Research Projects Graduate From
University to Marketplace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at C6 (reporting that universities
have reaped nearly doubled revenue between 1997 and 2002—from $699 million in
1997 to $1.3 billion in 2002—and sought patents for their inventions, resulting in
over 3,600 patents awarded in 2002).
50. See Next Generation Internet in the President’s Fiscal Year 2001 Budget: Hearing on
S. 2046 Before the S. Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space, 106th Cong. 60 (2000)
(statement of Neal Lane, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, and
Director, Office of Science & Technology Policy).
Much of the research funded by Federal agencies is implemented by
researchers at universities and in the commercial sector. . . . In numerous
cases, university researchers transfer their experience to startup companies
to rapidly make new capabilities available to the commercial sector. There
are many success stories for this model of technology transfer. . . . More
recently, the Google search engine company was started by two Stanford
students who took the results of NSF-funded research on digital libraries and
built a commercial service using these ideas.
Id.
51. See id.; Michael J. Kennedy, Technology and Emerging Growth Acquisitions: The
Private Perspective, 1255 PLI/CORP 921 (2001) (explaining and providing examples of
startups with university researchers).
52. See John Borland, Acacia Purchase Creates Net Patent Powerhouse,
CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 16, 2004, http://www.news.com/2100-1030_3-5494119.html
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company can avoid the selling company’s ongoing concerns and
53
liabilities.
Alternatively, the acquiring company can purchase the innovations
by acquiring the portfolios of intellectual property from distressed
54
entities, which results in competitive pricing.
Very few start-up
55
Many encounter
companies in the technology sector survive.
financial hardship, and their assets, often intangible property,
56
become available for potential purchasers to acquire. For example,
Commerce One once held many important Internet patents
concerning methods for communication over the Internet and
providing certain types of information when carrying out machine-to57
When the company
machine transactions over the Internet.
(discussing Acacia’s acquisitions of patent portfolios to further its goal of becoming
the leading technology licensing company); Press Release, Broadcom, Broadcom
Acquires Patent Portfolio From Cirrus Logic (Feb. 11, 2004), http://www.broadcom.
com/press/release.php?id=494286 (announcing Broadcom’s purchase of a patent
portfolio from Cirrus Logic for $18 million); Lisa Wang, AU Optronics Buys Patents
from IBM, TAIPEI TIMES, July 1, 2005, at 10, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/N
ews/biz/archives/2005/07/01/2003261773 (reporting that AU Optronics purchased
about 170 U.S. patents dealing with liquid-crystal display technology from IBM
Corp.).
53. See FRED M. GREGURAS & DAVID BARRY, ACQUIRING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND
OTHER
ASSETS
OUT
OF
A
DISTRESSED
COMPANY
1,
http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/Publications/Corporate/Acquiring_IP_and_Oth
er_Asse.pdf (comparing different ways of acquiring intellectual property assets from
distressed companies and noting the purchasing of assets as the “safest” where the
distressed entity “transfers its assets to a third party in trust to pay the proceeds of
sale to the seller’s creditors”).
54. See Tomas Kellner, Perot Backs $200 Million Bet on Patents (2005), FORBES.COM,
Aug. 9, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/home/services/2005/08/09/perot-patentsfund-cz_tk_0809patents.html (stating that Ross Perot’s new private equity fund was
set to purchase undervalued patent portfolios from companies in the areas of
semiconductor, biotech, nanotechnology and software); Jason Schultz, When Dot-Com
Patents Go Bad, SALON.COM, Dec. 13, 2004, http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/200
4/12/13/patent_reform/ (discussing the practice of patent purchase from distressed
companies for future offensive moves using patent weaponry against others).
55. See Stephen A. Gould, Distressed-Asset Sales Afford Significant Growth
Opportunities, BOSTON BUS. J., June 20, 2003, http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/s
tories/2003/06/23/focus2.html (noting that corporate bankruptcy filings are at a
high level).
56. See id. (identifying different types of intellectual property assets available for
piecemeal purchases from distressed companies); Mark Ingram, Guarding Ideas or Just
Patent Blackmail?, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 6, 2005, at B14, available at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20050602.wxtwtroll02/BN
Story (“Struggling companies with valuable patents have become acquisition targets,
as has the intellectual property of failed tech firms.”); Daryl Martin & David Drews,
The Secured Lender (Part I of II), IPFRONTLINE.COM, Jan. 21, 2006, http://www.ipfrontli
ne.com/depts/article.asp?id=8797&deptid=3 (comparing valuation criteria for
intellectual property assets in distressed companies and non-distressed companies).
57. See Stephen Lawson, Industry Group Might Buy Commerce One Patents, THE
INDUSTRY STANDARD, Nov. 25, 2004, http://www.thestandard.com/internetnews/0006
59.php (indicating that CommerceNet industry met to discuss the purchase of
patents from the bankrupt entity, Commerce One).
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declared bankruptcy, the patents became the property of the
bankruptcy estate, and were subsequently sold to a third party
58
purchaser.
II. A PARADIGM SHIFT IN ACQUISITION OF INNOVATIONS
In the last twenty years there has been a major change in the use of
59
patents in business strategy.
Intellectual property assets are
acquired for licensing purposes, and not merely for manufacturing.
Intellectual property assets are also acquired for offensive use
purposes.
A. The Licensing Model
Once upon a time, companies developed and acquired
technologies mainly for purposes of either directly or indirectly using
them in the operation of corporate entities or in the development of
60
end products and services for distribution in the marketplace.
Today, some companies generate more revenue from the licensing of
patents to others than from the manufacturing and distribution of
61
innovations-based products in the marketplace.
A classic example is Texas Instruments Corporation (“TI”). TI has
amassed billions of dollars in patent royalties, reaping generous
62
monetary benefits from its patents. TI discovered this new patent
business model after it employed a patent infringement campaign
against a number of Japanese companies for using computer chips

58. See John Markoff, Novell Discloses It Bought E-commerce Patents, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., May 3, 2005, at Finance 16, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/
02/business/novell.php (stating that there is a growing secondary market for
intellectual property acquired by companies that are not the original inventors or
holders).
59. See Gruner, supra note 44, at 12 (emphasizing that corporations concentrate
on patent ownership to “attract the investment needed for commercialization of
high-tech products”).
60. See STEPHEN C. GLAZIER, PATENT STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS 222 (3d ed. 1997)
(detailing how Texas Instruments’ business model changed from manufacturing of
electronic products to licensing intellectual property after the company aggressively
litigated against infringers).
61. See, e.g., Borland, supra note 52 (reporting that Acacia’s intellectual property
division produces no products and runs no services, but threatens others into taking
a license from Acacia, and observing that Intellectual Ventures has pursued a similar
strategy).
62. See Mike Hatcher, Rising Patent Awards Hint at Future Increase in Litigation,
IPFRONTLINE.COM, July 13, 2005, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=48
30&deptid=3 (indicating that in the mid-1980s TI began an aggressive licensing
program that has led to billions of dollars in profits for TI).
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63

based on TI patents. TI has acquired numerous companies with
technologies that complement and strengthen TI’s portfolio for its
64
For example, TI acquired Dot Wireless, a
licensing program.
privately held company in the business of developing and marketing
3G wireless CDMA technologies, software, and transceiver reference
65
This acquisition has enabled TI to offer an expanded
designs.
selection of programmable DSP and analog-enabled wireless
66
solutions in all 2.5G and 3G wireless standards and markets. TI also
purchased Chipcon, a company that designs short-range, low-power
67
wireless RF (radio frequency) transceiver devices. TI claimed that
Chipcon’s technologies would complement TI’s existing products
68
and strengthen TI’s high-performance analog portfolio. In addition
to the acquisition of young companies, TI has purchased established
companies such as chipmaker Burr-Brown, formerly known for its
69
highly regarded A/D and D/A converter chips. The acquisition of
Burr-Brown was thought to strengthen TI’s position in the data
converter and amplifier segments of the analog semiconductor
70
market.
TI is not an isolated example of the licensing business model. In
the 1990s, IBM embraced the patents-based profit business model by
71
licensing its patents. IBM aggressively sought patent protections for
63. See Andrew Pollack, Japanese Fight Back as U.S. Companies Press Patent Claims,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1992, at 1 (noting that TI received $256 million in royalties in
1991, mostly from Japanese companies).
64. See, e.g., Press Release, Texas Instruments, Texas Instruments Announces
Agreement to Acquire ATL Research A/S: Purchase Enhances RF Expertise for
Next Generation Wireless Products (June 15, 1999), http://www.ti.com/corp/docs/
press/company/1999/c99029.shtml; Press Release, Texas Instruments, TI to Acquire
Amati Communications for $395 Million: Move Strengthens TI Position in Emerging
$6 Billion Market (Nov. 19, 1997), http://www.ti.com/corp/docs/press/company/1
997/c97087.shtml.
65. See Texas Instruments Makes Another Acquisition, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2000, at
C3 (announcing the TI acquisition).
66. Press Release, Texas Instruments, TI Acquires Dot Wireless, a Leader in
CDMA Wireless Technology: Strength in IS-2000 Enables TI to Deliver Wireless
Solutions for All 3G Standards (June 29, 2000), http://www.ti.com/corp/docs/press
/company/2000/c00039.shtml.
67. See Press Release, National Electrical Manufacturers Association, Texas
Instruments to Acquire Chipcon (Dec. 22, 2005), http://www.nema.org/media/ind
/20051222b.cfm.
68. See id. (relaying TI Senior Vice President Gregg Lowe’s assessment of TI’s
purchase).
69. Press Release, Texas Instruments, Texas Instruments to Acquire Burr-Brown:
TI to Become a Leading Supplier of High-Performance Data Converters: Expanded
Analog Portfolio Accelerates DSP-Attach Strategy (June 21, 2000), http://www.ti.com
/corp/docs/press/company/2000/c00030.shtml.
70. See id. (elaborating on Burr-Brown’s expertise in the field of data
converters).
71. See Brad Stone, Nickels, Dimes, Billions: Big Tech Companies are Raking in Big
Bucks—A Little at a Time—By Charging for Use of Their Innovations, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2,
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its innovations by applying for and obtaining tens of thousands of
72
patents. For more than ten years, IBM held the most patents issued
73
annually by the U.S. Patent Office. The procured patents were for
74
both IBM’s products and its licensing program.
The licensing
program established IBM as the veritable poster child of the licensing
model, as the licensing revenue led to two billion dollars of pure
75
profit for the company. IBM is currently the fifteenth largest U.S.
76
company and the forty-second largest company globally.
IBM does not develop all of its technology for its licensing
products. IBM has aggressively acquired many companies for their
technologies in order to integrate those technologies with IBM’s
existing portfolios in a strategy to maintain IBM’s competitive
77
dominance. For example, IBM acquired Softek, a privately held
company known for its data mobility technology, notably its patented
Transparent Data Migration Facility solution, which changes
information technology infrastructure to create a simple, unified
approach to improving data movement and management across
78
storage vendor platforms and operating system environments. With
Softek technology, IBM’s clients can improve mobility of data while
keeping that data online and making applications available to end2004, http://newsweek.com/id/54559 (discussing how IBM and other companies
realize greater profits when they protect and license their patents).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Stone noted that:
IBM set the standard for patent licensing in the early ‘90s. While Big Blue
was in a steep decline, veteran employee and lawyer Marshall Phelps got the
company to raise the fees it charged others for piggybacking on its
ubiquitous technology. Phelps recalls that incoming CEO Lou Gerstner was
skeptical of the program; at RJR Nabisco, he had been involved in a patent
dispute with Procter & Gamble over soft chocolate-chip cookies. Phelps
changed Gerstner’s mind by cracking open an IBM PC and showing him all
the components that came from other companies. In other words:
hardware companies were interdependent, and as the biggest fish in the sea,
IBM should exploit that fact. A few years[] later[,] IBM was raking in $2
billion a year of almost pure profit from licensing revenue.
Id. .
76 See Fortune, Fortune Global 500 2007, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fo
rtune/global500/2007/full_list/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
77. Press Release, IBM, IBM to Acquire Softek: Combination to Provide Clients
the Ultimate Choice for Data Mobility (JAN. 29, 2007), http://www-03.ibm.com/press
/us/en/pressrelease/20976.wss (“The acquisition of Softek is the latest example of
IBM’s continuing strategy to blend software, hardware, and research into highermargin, standardized services that can be used with multiple clients to help them
transform their businesses.”); see Rick Sherman, BI Briefs: IBM Acquires Ascential
Software, DMREVIEW.COM, Mar. 17, 2005, http://www.dmreview.com/article_sub.cfm?
articleId=1023419 (stating that IBM acquisition of Ascential Software was its twentyfirst software acquisition in four years).
78. Press Release, IBM, IBM to Acquire Softek, supra note 77.
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79

IBM hopes to integrate Softek’s technology with IBM’s
users.
methods and expertise in storage and data services, resulting in
helping clients “increase the flexibility, efficiency and reliability of
moving data, enabling them to quickly respond to market needs and
80
seize new opportunities.”
Another example of acquisition for further research and
development is IBM’s purchase of MRO Software, Inc., the leading
81
provider of asset and service management software and consulting.
MRO software is a powerful addition to IBM’s portfolio of software
and services, enabling IBM to provide clients with a single approach
82
to managing all industrial and information technology assets.
IBM also acquired Internet Security Systems, Inc. for its software,
appliances, and services monitors used to manage and control
83
network vulnerabilities.
With this acquisition, IBM has replaced
labor-based processes with standardized software-based services to
help clients optimize their businesses. Additionally, IBM purchased
Watchfire, a privately held security and compliance testing software
company. IBM integrated its software with Watchfire’s to improve
84
the process for developing web applications.
B. The Offensive Use Model
After witnessing large corporations discover the use of patents in
their business strategy and reap handsome profits through their
patent licensing programs, some smaller entities chose to adopt a
new model of acquiring patents for offensive purposes.
Under this new model, a small company acquires patents or
patentable inventions, hoping to use litigation strategy to reap
85
generous returns during the legal life of the patents. The small
company does not expect the returns to come from manufacturing of

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Press Release, IBM, IBM to Acquire MRO Software, Inc.: Deal to Help
Clients Efficiently Manage Wide Range of Assets (Aug. 3, 2006), http://www-03.ibm.c
om/press/us/en/pressrelease/20062.wss.
82. See id. (detailing IBM’s plans following its completed acquisition of MRO
Software, Inc.).
83. See Press Release, IBM, IBM to Acquire Internet Security Systems:
Acquisition Bolsters IBM’s Position as a Leader in Security Solutions (Aug. 23, 2006),
http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/20164.wss.
84. Press Release, IBM, IBM Completes Acquisition of Watchfire (July 23, 2007),
http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/21921.wss.
85. See Ingram, supra note 56 (stating that recent high-profile patent
infringement cases feature small companies suing “giants” such as Microsoft and
eBay).
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86

products or providing direct services based on the innovations. The
small company lacks the resources, personnel, and facilities to
conduct further research and development or to create end products
87
The company instead realizes its returns on the
or services.
investment when it finds potentially deep-pocketed infringers or
companies with a large customer base using allegedly infringing
88
products or services. The infringers, through litigation and threat
of injunction, will be forced to pay the patent holder for the
89
infringement of its patents.
As a result of the offensive use of patents, there is an emerging
secondary market for intellectual property acquired by holders who
90
are not the original inventors or assignees. There are also websites
that specialize in patent brokerage, bringing ancillary patents to the
91
marketplace.
A notorious example of the offensive use of patents was
highlighted in the testimony provided by David Simon, Chief Patent
Counsel for Intel Corporation, at a congressional hearing on patent
92
reform. TechSearch was a patent holding company that acquired
93
patents from bankruptcy sales of distressed companies. TechSearch
86. See Mann, supra note 44, at 1023 (noting the increase of patent “trolls,”
which upset the licensing equilibrium because trolls do not make products).
87. See Jessica Holzer, Supreme Court Buried Patent Trolls, FORBES.COM, May 16,
2006, http://www.forbes.com/home/businessinthebeltway/2006/05/15/ebay-scotus
-patent-ruling-cx_jh_0516scotus.html (reporting that small patent holding companies
do not use their patents, but sue others for patent infringements); Google Sued
for $5B, REDHERRING, DEC. 29, 2005, http://www.redherring.com/Home/15098
(discussing Rates Technology as an example of a small patent-holding company with
a history of suing large technology companies for patent infringements).
88. See Joris Evers, Patent Hoarders Intensify Protection Issue, LINUXWORLD.COM,
Nov. 19, 2004, http://www.linuxworld.com.au/index.php/id;1874419189;fp;4;fpid;1
(reporting the recent formation of a new industry of companies that obtain and hold
patents only to enable them to sue infringing companies for monetary damages).
89. See Holzer, supra note 87 (“[P]atent [holding companies] are notorious for
using the threat of permanent injunction to extort hefty fees in licensing
negotiations as well as huge settlements from companies they have accused of
infringing.”).
90. See ThinkFire Establishes Patent Brokerage Division, IPFRONTLINE.COM, Oct. 3,
2005, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=6231&deptid=8 (reporting
that ThinkFire is a company specializing in the purchase and sale of patents in many
technological fields).
91. See, e.g., Global Technology Transfer Group, http://www.gttgrp.com/service
s/noncoreip.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2008); Patent Bridge Website, http://www.pate
ntbridge.com/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
92. See Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 31 (July
24, 2003) (statement of David Simon, Chief Patent Counsel, Intel Corp.) (presenting
the TechSearch case as a an example of a frivolous patent claim that led to extensive
litigation for Intel).
93. See id. (noting that TechSearch bought a patent in a bankruptcy sale, then
used that patent to sue Intel).
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was not in the semiconductor business, and had neither
semiconductor engineers nor computer designers among its
employees. TechSearch purchased a patent for $50,000 and later
used the patent to sue Intel, seeking an injunction and $8 billion in
94
damages.
There is another model of acquisition for offensive use, wherein a
shell company purchases patents for both defensive and offensive
use. An example of a company that used this practice and attracted
national media attention is Intellectual Ventures, founded by Nathan
95
Myhrvold, former Microsoft Chief Technologist.
The company
aggressively purchased innovations from inventors in the areas of
“software, e-commerce, communications, semiconductors, consumer
96
electronics and computer architecture.” The company asserted that
it acquired innovations defensively, claiming it purchased patents
that could pose threats to its investors such as Microsoft, Intel, Sony,
97
Apple, Nokia, Google, and eBay. Offensively, the company sought
98
to license the innovations to others and to use its patent arsenal to
99
collect damages against infringing defendants.
In summary, many companies today procure or acquire intellectual
property to further the research, development and augmentation of
their existing technology. These companies serve their customers by
licensing the integrated portfolios. In essence, licenses have become
100
However, some companies exploit their patent
the product itself.
acquisitions not for innovation related purposes, but to force others
to litigate or settle.

94. See id. (explaining further that obtaining an injunction would not benefit
TechSearch because TechSearch did not produce semiconductors, that TechSearch
was only after money, and that threatening an injunction was only a means of
harassing Intel).
95. See Brad Stone, Factory of the Future?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22, 2004, at 60
(“Microsoft alum Nathan Myhrvold runs a firm that doesn’t make anything, but it’s
hoarding the key to a new business age: intellectual property.”).
96. Id.
97. See id. (reporting that Myhrvold has raised $350 million in investments from
these large high tech firms).
98. See id. (explaining that Myhrvold set up a “patent marketplace” that allows a
patent owner to get money up front, gives investors the legal right to use those ideas,
and allows Myhrvold to rent those ideas to other companies).
99. See id. (“Referring to Intellectual Ventures’ portfolio of patents as his own,
[Myhrvold] says, ‘If giant corporations are making billions of dollars off my ideas, I
want something for it, and I don’t think there is anything wrong with that.’”).
100. See generally Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License is the Product: Comments on
the Promise of Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
891, 895–99 (1998) (noting that the license is the product for software because the
license delivers the use rights, and discussing the use of standard form contracts as a
way of providing software licenses to the mass market).
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III. INNOVATIONS AND CURRENT TAX POLICY
Although some companies have shifted their business model to
using intellectual property portfolios, it is undeniable that these
portfolios are important assets in positioning the companies in the
marketplace. Regardless of whether a company acquires innovations
to augment its existing technologies for the development of viable
products or merely for licensing strategies, it is undeniable that the
innovation market is heavily segmented. Startups and research
universities have transformed themselves into innovation production
101
centers.
A robust acquisition market for innovation, triggered by
adequate economic incentives to purchase innovation at various
development stages, is needed to supplement current economic
incentives for the development market. Sound tax policy could be a
useful tool in shaping the robust acquisition market of innovation.
Unfortunately, current tax incentives for innovation benefit the
development market only and do not reflect the realities of the
present segmented innovation market.
A. Current Tax Regime Governing Innovation Development
In 1954, Congress created a special tax incentive for inventors to
102
encourage innovation development. That incentive, found in § 174
of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”), permits a taxpayer to deduct
immediately research and development expenditures that would
103
This special provision is an
otherwise have to be capitalized.
important exception to the widely accepted general principle that
taxpayers must capitalize expenditures that produce benefits lasting
104
The exception from the normative
beyond the current tax year.
capitalization rule is justified because it encourages new research and
development activity and stimulates economic growth and
105
technological development.
101. See supra Part I.B (discussing how universities and startup companies interact
to create innovations).
102. See I.R.C. § 174(a) (allowing taxpayers to treat research or experimental
expenditures as expenses not chargeable to capital account as long as those
expenditures are related to the taxpayers trade or business).
103. See I.R.C. § 263(a)(1)(B) (providing that the capitalization rules under
§ 263(a) do not apply to research or experimental expenditures deductible under
§ 174(a)). See generally MAINE & NGUYEN, supra note 14, at 132–56 (providing a
thorough discussion of § 174).
104. Yale, supra note 13, at 549.
105. See, e.g., Donald C. Alexander, Research and Experimental Expenditures Under the
1954 Code, 10 TAX L. REV. 549, 549 (1955) (noting a primary reason for enacting
§ 174 was to create an incentive for new products and inventions through federal
subsidy of research and development startups and to better apportion specific
ordinary and necessary business costs to particular activities); William Natbony, The
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Also in 1954, Congress enacted § 1235 of the Code, another special
106
Section 1235 provides statutory assurance to
rule for inventors.
inventors that the sale of their inventions will qualify for reduced
107
108
capital gains rates, as opposed to ordinary income tax rates, even
109
if: (1) the sale involves installment or contingent payments, (2) the
Tax Incentives for Research and Development: An Analysis and a Proposal, 76 GEO. L.J.
347, 349 (1987) (explaining that Congress decided to provide taxpayers with the
option of an immediate deduction in order to encourage new research and
development); Richard L. Parker, The Innocent Civilians in the War Against NOL
Trafficking: Section 382 and High-Tech Start-Up Companies, 9 VA. TAX REV. 625, 694
(1990) (“The deduction election under § 174(a) is intended to encourage research
and development activities by allowing the cost of such activities to be used to offset
the income earned in the business at the earliest possible date.”); see also David S.
Hudson, The Tax Concept of Research or Experimentation, 45 TAX LAW. 85, 88–89 (1991)
(explaining that another justification for departure is that the capitalization rule is
difficult to apply to innovation development costs: research may not result in the
development of a patent or other identifiable asset; research often spans several years
with varying degrees of success; different and simultaneous research activities may
contribute in varying degrees to the development of an asset or more than one asset;
and research related to a project may partly fail and partly succeed); George
Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179, 1258–59
(1987) (stating that another reason for enacting § 174 was to reduce the uncertainty
caused by applying the asset-capitalization rules to research and development).
106. See I.R.C. § 1235 (guaranteeing capital gains rates, as opposed to higher
ordinary income tax rates, for any transfer of all substantial rights to a patent (or of
an undivided interest in all such rights to a patent) by certain holders to unrelated
parties); H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622 (1954), as reprinted in
1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621.
107. See JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL
TAXATION 211 (2007) (giving several policy reasons offered for the tax rate
preference accorded to capital gains).
Individual taxpayers generally prefer gains to be classified as capital gains
rather than ordinary income because certain capital gains are afforded
preferential tax treatment. Presently, the maximum rate at which most longterm capital gains are taxed is 15% (for tax years beginning before December
31, 2010), whereas the highest rate at which other types of income (ordinary
income and short-term capital gains) are taxed is 35%—a significant rate
differential for high earners.
Id.
108. I.R.C. §§ 1(a)–(d), (i)(1)–(2). Presently, the basic tax rates for individuals
are set out in § 1 of the Code.
[Sub]sections 1(a) through (d)[,] as adjusted by subsection (i)(2) . . .
currently establish five tax rates on ordinary income: 15%, 25%, 28%, 33%,
and 35%. Subsection 1(i)(1) adds a 10% rate. Each rate applies to a
different segment of income known as a tax bracket. It is the combined effect
of the tax rates and the tax brackets that creates the rate structure. The rates
rise with the tax brackets. Thus, the 10% rate applies to the lowest tax
bracket and the 35% rate applies to the highest tax bracket.
MILLER & MAINE, supra note 107, at 193.
109. See I.R.C. § 1235(a) (providing that § 1235 applies regardless of whether the
payments received are payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with
the transferee’s use of the patent or are contingent on the productivity, use, or
disposition of the property transferred); see also S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 439 (1954), as
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5082 (stating that § 1235 was intended “to give
statutory assurance to certain patent holders that the sale of a patent (whether as an
‘assignment’ or ‘exclusive license’) shall not be deemed not to constitute a ‘sale or
exchange’ for tax purposes solely on account of the mode of payment”).

2008]

ACQUIRING INNOVATION

795

transferor is a professional inventor and would otherwise have to
110
report ordinary income under general tax rules, and (3) the
invention has been held for less than one year and would otherwise
not meet the requisite one-year holding period under the general
111
capital gains provisions.
By assuring inventors that sales of their
inventions qualify for special tax treatment, § 1235 is designed to
encourage research and development that potentially leads to
patentable inventions. Indeed, a stated policy goal underlying
§ 1235’s enactment is “to provide an incentive to inventors to
112
contribute to the welfare of the Nation.”
Under these special tax rules, an inventor may presumably deduct
research costs and then enjoy a low capital gains tax on the later sale
113
of the resulting innovation.
Unfortunately, these innovation
development incentives, enacted more than fifty years ago, contain
limitations that minimize their effectiveness and fail to reflect the
realities of today’s innovation market.
Section 174 has limited applicability in that it requires research
expenditures be incurred in connection with the inventor’s trade or
114
business.
A taxpayer need not be currently conducting a business
(i.e., producing or selling any product) in order for research or
110. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A280 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622 at 113 (1954),
as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4747 (stating that § 1235 can provide capital
gains treatment to all inventors, whether amateur or professional, regardless how
often they sell their patents).
111. See I.R.C. § 1222(3). The tax treatment of a capital gain depends generally
on the property’s holding period. Under general characterization rules, only longterm capital gains are accorded preferential tax treatment. A long-term capital gain
requires a holding period of more than one year. Under the special characterization
provision of § 1235, however, the actual holding period becomes irrelevant.
112. S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 439 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621,
5082.
113. A related incentive for inventors is the exemption from the “recapture” rules
of § 1245. Under § 1245, any gain recognized on the disposition of intangible
personal property must be reported as ordinary income—not capital gain—to the
extent of any deductions (e.g., depreciation and amortization) taken with respect to
the property. I.R.C. § 1245(a)(1). In other words, any part of the gain that is
attributable to depreciation or amortization deductions previously attributable to the
transferred property must be recaptured as ordinary income and taxed at ordinary
rates, whereas any part of the gain that is attributable to economic appreciation may
be taxed at capital gains rates. Although intangible personal property is generally
subject to recapture, see Newton Insert Co. v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 570, 587 (1974), aff’d,
545 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1976), the government has clarified in an administrative
pronouncement that inventions, the creation costs of which were expensed under
§ 174, are not subject to § 1245 recapture. See Rev. Rul. 85-186, 1985-2 C.B. 84
(providing that § 174(a) deductions need not be recaptured as ordinary income on
later sale). Thus, the entire amount of gain recognized by an inventor on a later
sale—gain attributable to research and experimental costs expensed under § 174, as
well as gain attributable to true economic appreciation in value of the invention—
may receive preferential capital gains treatment under § 1235.
114. I.R.C. § 174(a).
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experimental expenditures to meet the “in connection with a trade
115
or business” requirement under § 174; however, courts have held
that a taxpayer must demonstrate a realistic prospect of entering into
a trade or business that will exploit the technology under
116
development.
In making this determination, the taxpayer must
demonstrate both an objective intent to enter into the trade or
117
business and the capability to do so.
This requirement fails to
recognize that, in today’s innovation marketplace, very few individual
inventors, startup companies, and young research entities develop
their innovations into end products or services for commercial
exploitation in trade or business, but rather intend to sell or license
their innovations to larger companies looking to acquire innovations
to supplement their own research or build promising intellectual
118
property portfolios. It is not completely clear whether § 174 applies
to a developer who intends to exploit the resulting innovation
through sale or license. As a general rule, the receipt of royalties
119
alone does not constitute a trade or business. The Tax Court, in a
few cases, has held that research activities and exploitation of the
resulting inventions by sale or license may constitute a trade or

115. Prior to 1974, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and the courts took the
position that to qualify for § 174 treatment, a taxpayer must have already engaged in
a trade or business. See Best Universal Lock Co. v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 1 (1965), acq.,
1966-2 C.B. 4; Koons v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 1092 (1961). The U.S. Supreme Court
rejected this narrow approach and held that pre-operational research or
experimental expenditures could qualify for the § 174 deduction. Snow v. Comm’r,
416 U.S. 500, 503–04 (1974).
116. See Kantor v. Comm’r, 998 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that a
“taxpayer must demonstrate a ‘realistic prospect’ of subsequently entering its own
business in connection with the fruits of the research, assuming that the research is
successful”); see also Zink v. United States, 929 F.2d 1015, 1023 (5th Cir. 1991);
Spellman v. Comm’r, 845 F.2d 148, 149 (7th Cir. 1988); Stauber v. Comm’r, 63
T.C.M. (CCH) 2258 (1992); Diamond v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 423, 439 (1989), aff’d, 930
F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1991).
117. See Kantor, 998 F.2d at 1518–19 (holding that the partnership did not possess
either the objective intent to market or the capability of marketing the developed
software at the time it incurred the research expenditures); see also Glassley v.
Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2898 (1996) (denying § 174 deductions for expenditures
to develop jojoba plants and seeds because taxpayer had neither intent nor capability
to enter jojoba farming business); Diamond, 930 F.2d at 375 (“The question is not
whether it is possible in principle, or by further contract, for [the taxpayer] to
engage in a trade or business, but whether, in reality, the [taxpayer] possessed the
capability in the years before the court to enter into a new trade or business in
connection with the [products being developed].”).
118. See supra Part I (discussing the increasing segmentation of the innovation
market).
119. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 113 (1981) (laying out rules for the application
of § 174, but not explicitly naming licensing as a trade or business that entitles
taxpayers to relief under that provision).
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120

However, such cases involved inventors who had
business.
121
developed a series of inventions. Arguably, § 174 does not apply to
an inventor who has not yet established herself in the trade or
business of being an inventor, but who nevertheless licenses the
results of her inventive activities for taxable income. Such a result
seems contrary to the goal behind innovation incentives generally.
Like § 174, § 1235 is of limited application. First, § 1235 applies
only to patents and patentable products, designs and inventions and,
arguably, does not apply to other desirable innovations, such as trade
secrets and computer software, both of which may not be
122
Second, § 1235 applies only to a transfer of “all
patentable.
substantial rights” to a patent, which does not include grants that are
limited geographically within the country of issuance or grants that
123
are limited to fields of use within trades or industries.
Third, and
120. See Kilroy v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 292, 295 (1980) (permitting
deductions where actions, over a period of years, relating to inventing activities
suggested taxpayers were engaged in the trade or business of inventing); Louw v.
Comm’r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421, 1422–23 (1971) (permitting deductions since
taxpayer’s free-lance inventive activities were of sufficiently sustained character to
qualify as engaging in a trade or business of an inventor); Avery v. Comm’r, 47 B.T.A.
538, 542 (1942) (permitting business deductions where taxpayer sold some
inventions and licensed other inventions for monetary considerations).
121. See Kilroy, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 295 (six patents); Avery, 47 B.T.A. at 540
(twelve patents). But see Cleveland v. Comm’r, 297 F.2d 169, 173 (4th Cir. 1961)
(one invention).
122. Section 1235 applies only to patents and not to other forms of intellectual
property, such as copyrights and trademarks. S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 441 (1954), as
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5084. Although the Code does not define a
patent for purposes of § 1235, the regulations provide that the term “patent” means a
patent granted under the provisions of Title 35 of the U.S. Code, as well as any
foreign patent with rights generally similar to those under a U.S. patent. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1235-2(a). Because § 1235 uses the language “rights to a patent,” an inventor
may receive capital gains treatment in the early stages of the inventive process. In
fact, nothing seems to prevent an inventor from receiving capital gains treatment at
the “eureka” moment if the inventor transfers all substantial rights. This position was
first declared in Philbrick v. Comm’r, 27 T.C. 346, 356 (1956), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 7:
The reports of the Senate Finance Committee and of the Conference
Committee on this latter section indicate that [“rights to a patent”] was
substituted, in lieu of a previously suggested phrase reading “rights
evidenced by a patent,” in order to make clear that the section applied, even
though the patent itself might not have been issued at the time of the
transfer, and even though an application for the patent might not then have
been made.
Id. Essentially, all that must be transferred is all substantial rights to a patentable
product, design, invention, or plant. Gilson v. Comm’r, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 922
(1984). The regulations now provide for the same. Section 1.1235-2(a) of the
Treasury regulations states that it is unnecessary for a patent application to be in
existence if the other requirements of § 1235 are met. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a).
123. The term “all substantial rights” refers to “all rights (whether or not then
held by the grantor) which are of value at the time the rights to the patent (or an
undivided interest therein) are transferred.” Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1). Whether
or not all substantial rights to a patent are transferred in a transaction depends upon
the circumstances surrounding the entire transaction and not the particular
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most significantly, § 1235’s favorable capital gains treatment applies
124
only if the transferor is a statutorily defined “holder” of the patent.
The holder of a patent is defined as any individual whose personal
125
efforts created the patent property. In other words, only individuals
126
(original inventors) can qualify under § 1235 as holders. This limits
the benefits of the provision to individual inventors working out of
their garage. As a result, § 1235 provides absolutely no economic
benefit to the more common startup companies and small research
127
entities whose employees conduct their research.
Perhaps the biggest flaw with both incentive provisions—§ 174 and
§ 1235—is that they focus on the innovation development market
128
They reward the inventor/transferor only. But mere
only.
terminology used in the transfer instrument. Id. Although the facts and
circumstances surrounding a transfer are to be considered, the regulations list four
transfers that, because they are limited in scope, do not result in a transfer of all
substantial rights to qualify for favorable capital gains treatment under § 1235. They
are: (1) the grant of a patent that is limited geographically within the country of
issuance; (2) the grant of a patent that is limited in duration by the terms of the
agreement; (3) the grant of a patent that is limited to fields of use within trades or
industries, that are less than all the rights covered by the patent, and that exist and
have value at the time of the grant; and (4) the grant of less than all the claims or
inventions covered by the patent that exist and have value at the time of the grant.
Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(i)-(iv). The regulations also provide two examples of rights that
may be retained by the holder because they are not considered “substantial”:
(1) the retention by the transferor of legal title for the purpose of securing
performance or payment by the transferee in a transaction involving the transfer of
an exclusive license to manufacture, use, and sell for the life of the patent; and
(2) the retention by the transferor of rights in the property that are not inconsistent
with the passage of ownership, such as the retention of a security interest (such as a
vendor’s lien), or a reservation in the nature of a condition subsequent (such as a
provision for forfeiture on account of nonperformance). Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(2)(i)–
(ii).
124. I.R.C. § 1235(a).
125. I.R.C. § 1235(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(1)(i). More specifically, the
regulations provide that a holder is any individual whose efforts created the patent
property and who would qualify as the “original and first” inventor, or joint inventor,
under the patent laws. See id. (referring to Title 35 of the Code). An inventor’s
employer would not qualify as a holder “even though he may be the equitable owner
of the patent by virtue of an employment relationship with the inventor.” S. REP. NO.
83-1622, at 439–40 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5082–83.
126. Although corporations and partnerships may not be qualified holders, each
member of a partnership who is an individual, however, may qualify as a holder as to
his or her pro-rata share of a patent owned by the partnership. Treas. Reg. § 1.12352(d)(2).
127. See supra Part I.B (describing the increasing role of start-up companies and
universities in innovation development).
128. Another tax incentive for the innovation development market is the research
credit found in § 41 of the Code. I.R.C. § 41. The temporary credit has been
modified and extended many times since the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
created it. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(a), 95 Stat. 172, 241 (1981) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 41) (establishing original research credit as I.R.C. § 44F). The
general research credit is incremental, such that it is equal to a certain percentage of
qualified research spending above a base amount, which can be thought of as a
firm’s normal level of research and development investment. The incremental
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inventive activity alone does not contribute to the nation’s welfare.
The transfer of innovation to the right acquirers for further research
and product development or licensing is also important and must be
encouraged.
Unfortunately, the current tax regime fails to
adequately incentivize acquisitions of innovation.
B. Current Tax Regime Governing Innovation Acquisitions
Unlike innovation development costs, innovation acquisition costs
are not subject to any special tax rules, but instead are governed by
129
the general rules applicable to all intangible property. Under these
rules, the costs of acquiring innovation are not deductible when
130
incurred, but are subject to the general capitalization principle.
More specifically, a taxpayer is required to capitalize amounts paid to
another party in a purchase or similar transaction to acquire
131
innovation from that party.
Capitalized innovation acquisition costs are then deducted over
132
time through tax depreciation rules.
In an economic sense,
“depreciation is the decline in value of an asset due to wear and tear
133
In the tax sense, depreciation is a deduction
and obsolescence.”
from income, permitting the taxpayer to recover the cost of that
134
asset.
Depreciation methods are sometimes called cost recovery

nature of the credit provides an incentive for increasing research and development
expenditures over time. It might be possible for research expenses to qualify for the
credit under § 41, as well as qualify for the deduction under § 174. In such a case, to
the extent a credit is taken under § 41, deductions under § 174 must be reduced
pursuant to § 280C. A taxpayer can elect to claim a reduced research credit under
§ 41 and thereby avoid a reduction of the § 174 deduction. I.R.C. § 280C(c)(1)–(3).
129. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 197, 263(a).
130. I.R.C. § 263(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4.
131. Treas. Reg. § 1.263F(a)-4(b)(1)(i), 4(c)(1). Treasury regulations list patents
as an example of intangibles that must be capitalized if acquired from another
person. Id. § 1.263(a)-4(c)(1)(vii), (viii), (xiv). The capitalization rule is broader,
however, and applies also to “separate and distinct intangible asset[s]” acquired from
another person. Id. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(iii). The term “separate and distinct
intangible asset” means: (1) a property interest of ascertainable and measurable
monetary value (2) that is subject to protection under applicable state, federal, or
foreign law, and (3) the possession and control of which is intrinsically capable of
being sold, transferred, or pledged (ignoring any restrictions imposed on
assignability) separate and apart from a trade or business. Id. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(3)(i).
A taxpayer is also required to capitalize transaction costs that facilitate the taxpayer’s
acquisition. Id. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(v), 4(e)(1)(i). A taxpayer is not required to
capitalize employee compensation and overhead costs related to an intangible
acquisition, apparently due to burdens of allocating such transaction costs among
acquired intangible assets. Id. § 1.263(a)-4(e)(4)(i).
132. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 167, 197.
133. MILLER & MAINE, supra note 107, at 118.
134. See id. at 118 (providing an overview of the concept of depreciation).

800

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:775

135

So, for example, if a patent used in our business for five
systems.
years cost us $20,000, we might take a $4,000 deduction each year on
our taxes for five years to reflect the decline in value of that asset and
136
We
to reflect its contribution to the production of gross income.
do not deduct the entire cost of the patent all at once because the
patent helped produce income over five years. If we are going to
match our expenses against the revenues they helped produce, we
137
must spread out the deduction over the useful life of the patent.
This is, of course, a basic application of the principle discussed above
138
that the costs of assets must be capitalized.
As this example illustrates, the goal of tax depreciation is to achieve
a fair allocation of the costs of acquiring an asset to the period in
which the purchaser realizes income from the asset. In other words,
depreciation provides an accurate measurement of income. As
explained below, the government has departed from this tax policy
goal with respect to innovation acquisition. It might be argued that
departure from accurate income measurement might be justified to
lower compliance and administrative costs. Ironically, the current
regime fails to achieve either effective administration or accurate
income measurement. As discussed below, the capitalized costs of
acquiring innovation are subject to a host of irrational tax
139
depreciation rules. Specifically, different methods and different
140
periods for recovery of capitalized innovation acquisition costs are
135. As explained below, there are different methods of depreciating the
capitalized acquisition costs of separately acquired patents. The simplest method of
depreciation is known as the “straight-line method,” under which the capitalized
costs of acquiring patents (less salvage value) are deducted ratably over the
property’s estimated useful life. I.R.C. § 167; Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-1.
136. This is the straight-line method of depreciation. See infra note 151.
137. If $20,000 were deductible in full in the year of acquisition, then there would
be a mismatch of income and the expenses that produced that income. Income
would be understated in the year of acquisition and overstated in later years. To
avoid this problem and to better allocate the acquisition cost, we are not entitled to
an immediate deduction in the year of acquisition, but are allowed $4,000 annual
depreciation tax deductions over the patent’s five-year useful life. At the end of the
patent’s useful life, the acquisition costs will have been fully recovered, and the
patent’s basis will be zero, reflecting that all capitalized costs have been recovered
fully. See I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (providing that the patent’s basis is reduced each year
as depreciation deductions are taken with respect to the asset).
138. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
139. Capitalized innovation acquisition costs are depreciated using either the
“straight-line method” or the “income-forecast method” depending on a number of
factors. See infra notes 152–160 and accompanying text. Accelerated or “bonus”
depreciation methods that are available for depreciable tangible property are not
available for intangible innovations. See I.R.C. § 168(b) (providing generally that the
double declining balance method applies if the property is tangible).
140. Some innovations are depreciated over an arbitrary fifteen-year period
regardless of the asset’s legal or useful life. Other innovations are depreciated over
their useful life. Others are depreciated only as the innovation generates income. As
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provided depending on the type of innovation acquired,
142
143
manner of procurement, and even the method of payment.

801
141

the

1. Current tax depreciation rules for capitalized innovation acquisition costs
The starting point for determining the proper depreciation
deductions for capitalized innovation acquisition costs is § 197 of the
144
Enacted in 1993, § 197 provides a single depreciation
Code.
method (straight-line depreciation) and a single recovery period
145
(fifteen years) for the costs of acquiring many forms of innovation.
Law enacted prior to 1993 continues to apply for depreciating the
costs of acquiring all other forms of innovation (i.e., innovations not
146
within the scope of § 197).
Section 197 provides a list of intangible assets that fall within the
definition of “section 197 intangibles” and are subject to fifteen-year
147
amortization.
A “section 197 intangible” includes any patent,
with the appropriate depreciation method, the appropriate recovery period depends
on a number of factors. See infra notes 145–153 and accompanying text.
141. As will be discussed, trade secrets and know-how, patents, and computer
software are treated differently for depreciation purposes. Trade secrets purchased
separately (not in connection with the purchase of other assets that constitute a trade
or business) are depreciated over fifteen years. Patents acquired separately are
depreciated over their useful life. Computer software acquired separately is
depreciated over three years. See infra notes 145–152 and accompanying text.
142. Innovation may be acquired in a transaction involving the acquisition of a
trade or business or may be acquired separately or with a group of assets that
collectively do not constitute a trade or business. For many types of innovation, such
as patents, patent applications, and computer software, depreciation rules differ
depending on the method of procurement. See infra notes 149–152, 172 and
accompanying text.
143. As consideration, innovation acquirers may make up-front principal
payments, installment payments of a fixed amount, payments contingent on
exploitation of the innovation, or use any combination of these methods. When
contingent payments are made, depreciation rules differ depending on whether the
innovation is acquired separately or with a trade or business. See infra notes 173–176
and accompanying text.
144. I.R.C. § 197(a).
145. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF
TAX SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 1993 147 (Comm. Print 1993) (explaining that Congress
created § 197 to eliminate considerable confusion over the federal tax treatment of
amortizable intangible assets). Specifically, § 197 provides a fifteen-year depreciation
deduction for the capitalized costs of an “amortizable section 197 intangible,” and
prohibits any other depreciation or amortization deduction with respect to that
property. I.R.C. § 197(a)–(b). Section 197 defines an “amortizable section 197
intangible” as any “section 197 intangible” acquired after August 10, 1993, and held
in connection with a trade or business or an activity conducted for profit. Id.
§ 197(c)(1). Section 197 provides a list of intangible assets that fall within the
definition of “section 197 intangible” and are subject to fifteen-year amortization. Id.
Section 197 also specifically excludes certain intangible assets. Id.
146. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-14(a) (providing that intangibles excluded from
§ 197 are depreciable only if they qualify as property subject to the allowance for
depreciation under § 167(a)).
147. I.R.C. § 197(d).
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formula, process, design, pattern, know-how, format, or other similar
148
Although the definition of “section 197 intangible”
property.
appears broad enough to encompass nearly all forms of innovation,
there is an important exception for certain intangibles not acquired
in a transaction (or series of related transactions) involving the
acquisition of assets constituting a trade or business or substantial
149
portion thereof. For example, § 197 intangibles do not include any
interest in a patent or patent application that is not acquired as part
150
Such patents and patent
of a purchase of a trade or business.
applications acquired separately are not subject to § 197’s ratable
fifteen-year amortization. Rather, depreciation for these acquired
151
assets continues to be governed by pre-§ 197 law.
Under pre-§ 197 law, the capitalized costs of innovations (i.e.,
separately acquired innovations, such as patents) are recovered under

148. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(5).
149. I.R.C. § 197(e)(4). A trade or business that is acquired in a series of related
transactions will be considered acquired in one transaction for § 197 purposes. Id.
Whether the exception for separately acquired patents applies depends on whether
the assets were acquired in a transaction (or series of related transactions) involving
the acquisition of assets constituting a trade or business or substantial portion
thereof. This determination is not always easy. For purposes of § 197, an asset, or
group of assets, constitutes a trade or business or a substantial portion thereof if its
use would constitute a trade or business under § 1060. Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(e)(1).
A group of assets constitutes a trade or business if (1) the use of such assets would
constitute an active trade or business under § 355, or (2) its character is such that
goodwill or going concern value could under any circumstances attach to such
group. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1(b)(2)(A)–(B). In determining whether goodwill or
going concern value should attach to assets, all facts and circumstances are taken
into account, including any continuing employee relationships or covenants not to
compete. Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(e)(1). In some circumstances, the acquisition of a
single asset may be treated as the acquisition of a trade or business or a substantial
portion thereof. In such a case, the asset would be removed from the exception for
intangibles purchased separately, thus requiring the application of § 197. H.R. REP.
NO. 103-213, at 678 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1367.
150. I.R.C. § 197(e)(4)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(c)(7). A patent includes any
incidental rights, such as a trademark or a trade name, that are necessary to effect
the acquisition of title to, the ownership of, or the right to use the property and that
are used only in connection with that property. Id.
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-14(a). Under historical depreciation rules (pre§ 197), if an acquired intangible asset could be shown to have a limited useful life,
then the capitalized acquisition costs were depreciable over that asset’s lifetime. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3(a) (“If an intangible asset is known from experience or
other factors to be of use in the business or in the production of income for only a
limited period, the length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such
an intangible asset may be the subject of a depreciation allowance.”). If, however, an
acquired intangible asset could not be shown to have a limited useful life, then the
acquisition costs were not depreciable, but could only be recovered upon
abandonment or disposition of the asset. See id. (“An intangible asset, the useful life
of which is not limited, is not subject to the allowance for depreciation.”). Under
this legal framework, patents were eligible for depreciation allowances due to the fact
that they have limited, statutorily defined legal lives. Indeed, the regulations under
§ 167 specifically mention patents as intangible assets eligible for depreciation. Id.
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one of two methods:
the straight-line method and the income152
Under the straight-line method, capitalized
forecast method.
acquisition costs are deducted ratably over the asset’s estimated
153
useful life. This recovery period is not necessarily the statutory legal
life of the asset, but rather the period over which the asset may
reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his or her
154
The example
trade or business or in the production of income.
155
above illustrates use of the straight-line method.
Under the income-forecast method, capitalized acquisition costs
are recovered as income is earned from exploitation of the
156
innovation.
The depreciation allowance in any given year is
computed by multiplying the original capitalized acquisition cost of
the innovation by a fraction, the numerator of which is income from
the asset for the taxable year, and the denominator of which is
forecasted or estimated total income to be earned in connection with
157
the asset during its useful life.
The following simple example
illustrates the computation. In Year 1, Taxpayer purchases a patent
for $100 and estimates that forecasted total income from the patent
152. Some methods of calculating depreciation are generally not available. For
example, the sliding scale method, under which depreciation is typically computed
based on a declining rate of exhaustion over time, is typically unavailable. See Rev.
Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, amplified by Rev. Rul. 64-273, 1964-2 C.B. 62, amplified by
Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C.B. 91 (prohibiting sliding scale method to depreciate the
cost of a patent). Likewise, the cost recovery method, under which a taxpayer can
recover all costs before reporting any income, is generally unavailable. See Schneider
v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 18, 32 (1975), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 2 (requiring taxpayer to use
income forecast method instead of cost-recovery method because of uneven flow of
income associated with asset).
153. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-1 (1960). There is a statutory exception for separately
acquired computer software, which is depreciated over an arbitrary three-year
period. I.R.C. § 167(f); see infra note 227 and accompanying text.
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b). A taxpayer may establish the useful life for
depreciation purposes based upon his or her own experience with similar property.
If such experience is inadequate, a taxpayer may establish useful life based upon the
general industry standards. Id. Further, a taxpayer needs only to establish useful life
with “reasonable accuracy.” Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3(a) (2004). According to one
court, “[e]xtreme exactitude in ascertaining the duration of an asset is a paradigm
that the law does not demand. All that the law and regulations require is reasonable
accuracy in forecasting the asset’s useful life.” Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v.
United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1253–54 (5th Cir. 1973). Useful life should be based
on facts existing as of the close of the taxable year at issue. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)0(a). The exclusive use of hindsight evidence (after the close of the taxable year in
which taxpayer commences depreciation) to prove the limited useful life of property
is fatal to a depreciation deduction. See, e.g., S. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Comm’r, 847
F.2d 131, 137 (4th Cir. 1988); Banc One Corp. v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 476, 499 (1985),
aff’d, 815 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1987) (unpublished).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 133–138 .
156. I.R.C. § 167(g); see Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, amplified by, Rev. Rul. 64273, 1964-2 C.B. 62, amplified by, Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C.B. 91.
157. See I.R.C. § 167(g); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(n)-4(a), 67 Fed. Reg. 38,025,
38,032 (May 31, 2002); Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68.
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will be $200. In Year 1, the patent generates income of $80. The
depreciation allowance for Year 1 is $40, computed by multiplying
the capitalized acquisition cost of $100 by the fraction obtained by
dividing current year income of $80 by forecasted total income of
158
$200. Under this approach, 40% of forecasted income was earned
in Year 1, so 40% of the total purchase cost was deducted in Year 1.
In determining forecasted total income (the denominator of the
income-forecast fraction), a taxpayer must only include income that
the taxpayer reasonably believes will be earned from the patent up to
and including the tenth taxable year after the year in which the
159
In the tenth taxable year, a taxpayer
patent is placed in service.
may deduct in full (as a depreciation allowance) the remaining
160
unrecovered cost or other basis in the patent.
With this ten-year
rule, the income-forecast method of depreciation provides a
maximum recovery period of ten years for separately acquired
innovations, much less than the fifteen-year recovery period for
innovations acquired as part of a trade or business.
In sum, there are currently two approaches for capitalized
innovation acquisition costs. First, the capitalized costs of acquiring
many forms of innovation (e.g., patents and computer software
158. This example was taken from Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(n)-4(e), Ex. 1, 67
Fed. Reg. 38,025, 38,033 (May 31, 2002). Taxpayers must evaluate the accuracy of
their income forecasts annually. If information is discovered in a later taxable year
that indicates that forecasted total income is inaccurate, a taxpayer must compute
“revised forecasted total income” for the taxable year. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(n)3(c), 67 Fed. Reg. 38,025, 38,031 (May 31, 2002). The proposed regulations under
§ 167(g) provide a revised computation for computing depreciation allowances in
years when conditions necessitate using a revised forecasted total income that differs
from the forecasted total income used in computing depreciation allowances in
previous years. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(n)-4(b), 67 Fed. Reg. 38,025, 38,032 (May
31, 2002).
159. I.R.C. § 167(g)(1)(A), (g)(5)(C); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(n)-3(b), 67 Fed.
Reg. 38,025, 38,031 (May 31, 2002). The projection should be based on conditions
known to exist at the end of the year for which the patent is placed in service, and
should include not only income that the taxpayer forecasts it will earn, but also
income that may be earned by other owners of the patent during that same period.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(n)-3(b), 67 Fed. Reg. 38,025, 38,031 (May 31, 2002);
Guidance on Cost Recovery Under the Income Forecast Method, 67 Fed. Reg.
38,025, 38,027 (proposed May 31, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
160. I.R.C. § 167(g)(1)(c); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(n)-4(d)(1)(ii), 67 Fed. Reg.
38,025, 38,033 (May 31, 2002). If the patent ceases to generate income before the
end of the tenth year, a taxpayer may deduct in full (as a depreciation allowance) the
remaining depreciable basis in the year income from the patent ceases completely.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(n)-4(d)(1)(i), -4(d)(3), 67 Fed. Reg. 38,025, 38,033 (May
31, 2002). Thus, a taxpayer may deduct as a depreciation allowance the remaining
depreciable basis in the earlier of (1) the year in which the taxpayer reasonably
believes that no income from the patent will be included in current year income in
any subsequent taxable year up to and including the tenth taxable year following the
taxable year the patent is placed in service, or (2) the tenth taxable year following
the taxable year the patent is placed in service. Id. § 1.167(n)-4(d)(1)(i)–(ii).
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acquired with a trade or business, and trade secrets and know-how
acquired either separately or with a trade or business) are grouped
161
into a single class and recovered ratably over a fifteen-year period.
Second, the capitalized costs of acquiring other forms of innovation
(e.g., patents acquired separately) are recovered either over the
asset’s useful life or, under the income-forecast method, over a
162
maximum recovery period of ten years.
This cost recovery regime
for capitalized innovation acquisition costs presents obvious
problems, illustrated in the following section.
2. Problems with current tax depreciation rules for innovation acquisition
costs
With § 197’s grouping approach, the government adopted a single
depreciation method and a single recovery period “to simplify the
rules for depreciating intangibles and to reduce the number of
controversies arising from the need to determine which intangibles
163
are depreciable and what their recovery periods should be.”
The
government selected the recovery period of fifteen years so that the
new legislation would be approximately revenue neutral over the first
164
Although much can be said for a simplified, revenue
five years.
neutral approach, the depreciation regime is not ideal from the
standpoint of encouraging desirable innovation acquisitions and
165
achieving the tax policy goal of accurate reflection of income.
For innovations not governed by § 197, the government adopts an
166
This asset-specific approach is a better
asset-by-asset approach.
matching mechanism and provides a more accurate picture of a
taxpayer’s income than does an arbitrary cost-allocation mechanism
for all innovations, such as the one § 197 provides (grouping all
innovations acquired with a business into a single, fifteen-year
category).
However, the straight-line method, while offering
simplicity, employs a useful life recovery period that results in the
mismatch of income and costs if the acquired innovation generates
an uneven flow of income. And the income forecast method, while
161. See supra notes 147–151 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 152–160 and accompanying text.
163. Mary LaFrance, Days of our Lives: The Impact of Section 197 on Copyrights,
Patents and Related Property, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 320 (1995).
164. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 145, at 147 (acknowledging
that the asset’s useful life may either fall short or exceed the amortization period, but
nevertheless establishing such amortization period based on goal of revenue
neutrality over subsequent five fiscal years).
165. See supra notes 133–138 and accompanying text (demonstrating the general
tax rule that the cost of assets must be capitalized).
166. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (pairing depreciation models with asset types).
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providing a more accurate allocation of purchase costs to the period
in which the taxpayer realizes income from the patent, fails to
achieve ideal allocation by capping the depreciation period at ten
167
years. The income-forecast method also lacks simplicity. It is often
difficult to estimate all future income to be generated by a patent, in
168
A
which case the method is not available to a patent acquirer.
purchaser must always evaluate the accuracy of income forecasts
annually; if a purchaser discovers information in a later year that
indicates that forecasted total income is inaccurate, then the
169
purchaser must revise the forecast. Moreover, patents depreciated
under the income-forecast method are subject to a set of complicated
170
These complications make the cost of tax
“look-back” rules.
accounting high for innovation acquirers.
Distinctions under the current depreciation regime for innovation
raise some fundamental questions. For example, why is it that a
patent acquired as part of the acquisition of a business is subject to
ratable fifteen-year amortization (which may be shorter or longer
than the actual useful life of the patent), but a patent acquired
separately benefits from more rapid depreciation allowances (shorter
useful life under the straight-line method or accelerated allowances
under the income forecast method)? Does it make sense that all
patents, regardless of type or remaining legal life, acquired along
with a business are grouped into a single category with a single
recovery method and period, whereas patents acquired separately are
depreciated using an asset-by-asset approach? If a patent derived its
value from its relationship to a product, service, or goodwill and
reputation of a business like a trademark or trade name, it might
make sense to include patents within the definition of § 197 and
167. See I.R.C. § 167(g)(1)(A) (taking into account only income through the
property’s tenth year of service).
168. See Hadley v. Comm’r, 819 F.2d 359, 366 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying availability
of income-forecast method to depreciation of manuscript creation costs not because
of difficulty in estimating future income stream before book’s publishing, but rather
because such a holding comports with Congress’s intent).
169. Supra notes 158–159 and accompanying text.
170. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(n)-6, 67 Fed. Reg. 38025-01 (May 31, 2002).
Under the look-back rules, taxpayers using the income-forecast method are required
to pay, or are entitled to receive, interest computed under the look-back method for
any year to which the look-back requirement applies (recomputation year). Id.
Interest may arise if either forecasted total income or revised forecasted total income
is overestimated or underestimated. Taxpayers are required to pay look-back interest
if deductions are accelerated due to the underestimation of total income expected to
be earned with respect to the property. Conversely, taxpayers are entitled to receive
look-back interest if deductions are delayed as a result of overestimating total income
expected to be earned with respect to the property. Id. For the series of
computations required to determine look-back interest that a taxpayer is either
required to pay or is entitled to receive, see id. § 1.167(n)-6(b), -6(d).
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provide an arbitrary recovery period to avoid messy valuation and
intangible asset allocation problems. However, a patent acquired as
part of the purchase of a trade or business does not necessarily derive
its value from the goodwill and reputation of the business with which
171
it is associated. Patents can be freely sold, assigned, or transferred
172
Hence, the
without associated goodwill or other business assets.
depreciation schedule of patents need not necessarily parallel the
arbitrary depreciation schedule applicable to all intangibles acquired
in a business acquisition, such as trademarks and trade names, which
lack inherent value.
Another puzzling distinction under the current depreciation
regime for innovation acquisitions relates to the treatment of
173
contingent payments.
Contingent payments made for an
innovation acquired with a business are treated vastly different from
contingent payments made for an innovation acquired separately. If
a contingent payment is made for innovation acquired with a
business, the contingent amount is depreciated ratably over the
174
If a contingent payment is
remainder of the fifteen-year period.
made for innovation acquired separately, then the contingent
175
amount is fully deductible in the year paid. The apparent rationale
171. Trademarks, in part, derive their value from good will, which is the value of a
business beyond that inherent in its tangible assets. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 2:18–19 (4th ed. 2007)
(citing Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Menin, 115 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1940) (explaining that
goodwill encompasses all of the qualities that attract customers to a business), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 578 (1941)). The value of patents, however, stems from the owner’s
ability to “exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering for sale the
invention within the United States” for a set number of years. See 5 DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.01 (2004).
172. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135
(1969) (citing Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891)) (“The law . . .
recognizes that [the patent holder] may assign to another his patent, in whole or in
part, and may license others to practice his invention.”).
173. The adjusted basis of an acquired innovation that is a § 197 intangible does
not include any portion of the purchase price that is contingent. Rather, the
adjusted basis is increased only when the contingency is satisfied. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.197-2(f)(2)(iii) (referencing the rules of I.R.C. §§ 461, 483, and 1275 to
determine when and how much of a contingent payment is properly included in cost
basis).
174. Id. § 1.197-2(f)(2)(i). According to the legislative history:
[I]f a portion of the cost of acquiring an amortizable section 197 intangible
is contingent, the adjusted basis of the section 197 intangible is to be
increased as of the beginning of the month that the contingent amount is
paid or incurred. This additional amount is to be amortized ratably over the
remaining months in the . . . amortization period that applies to the
intangible as of the beginning of the month that the contingent amount is
paid or incurred.
H.R. REP. NO. 103-213, at 685 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1374.
175. Under this approach, known as the “variable contingent payment” method
of depreciation, a taxpayer adds the amount of the contingent payments to the basis
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behind permitting an immediate deduction for each year’s
contingent payment for separately acquired innovation is that each
payment reflects the annual cost of the innovation and that a current
176
deduction properly matches expenses with income. Should not the
same policy rationale be used to support current deductions for all
contingent payments, regardless of whether the patent is acquired
separately or with a trade or business? Any concerns about valuing
intangibles acquired in a business acquisition or about allocating the
purchase price among acquired intangibles—concerns purportedly
addressed by § 197—are nonexistent when contingent payments are
planned.
In sum, the current tax regime governing innovations fails to
adequately encourage development and acquisitions of innovations.
The government should explore new tax incentives that recognize
the major shift in the innovation market toward a segmentation
model where research universities and small companies are the
epicenters of ideas, complementing and maximizing the innovations
of large and established companies with strong marketing and
distribution forces. Segmentation of innovation allows new ideas to
develop at a faster pace, fostering strong competition and leading to
a robust acquisition market, and, therefore should be encouraged.
IV. EXPLORING ACCELERATED TAX INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION
ACQUISITIONS
The segmentation of the innovation market demonstrates that
corporations today cannot internally develop all innovations with
177
immediate commercialization potential.
Small companies and
universities are the incubation centers of new innovations and serve
of the patent and then immediately takes a depreciation deduction for an equal
amount. The government has sanctioned the variable contingent payment method.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-14(c)(4) (describing the basis of a patent as either
depreciated ratably over its useful life or under the income forecast method); see also
Associated Patentees, Inc. v. Comm’r, 4 T.C. 979, 985–87 (1945), acq., 1959-2 C.B. 3
(sanctioning deduction for variable contingent payments); Rev. Rule 67-136, 1967-1
C.B. 58 (agreeing to following the Associated Patentees decision); Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1218 (1975) (recognizing that
deducting yearly payments on a patent is a reasonable method of depreciation).
176. See Associated Patentees, 4 T.C. at 986 (concluding that a current deduction for
the entire contingent payment gives the taxpayer “a reasonable, and not more than a
reasonable,” depreciation allowance, whereas permitting as depreciation only a
proportionate part of the payment “might deny the recovery of [the taxpayer’s] cost
and would unquestionably result in a distortion of income”).
177. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 42, at 10 (asserting that, in reaction
to the increasing market dominance of large corporations, an increase in
segmentation of innovations will occur and startups and small companies will remain
in the market by complementing the innovation portfolios of big companies).
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the important niche of supplying innovations to large corporations.
Thus, the acquisition of innovations at various stages should be
encouraged through tax policy.
Unfortunately, current tax incentives are aimed at the innovation
179
There is a deduction available to
development market only.
individual and corporate inventors for otherwise capitalized
180
development costs, and there is a limited guarantee of preferential
tax treatment to individual inventors on later sales of resultant
181
But both incentives are limited in application and
innovations.
both apply only to developers. This regime reflects the old focus on
the development market and does not reflect the reality of the new
acquisition market, that is to say, segmentation and licensing. It is
time to explore an appropriate regime that reflects the reality of the
segmentation of the innovation market—a system that that
encourages a robust acquisition market.
One intended purpose of allowing a deduction for capital research
and experimental expenditures was to encourage new research
activity and thus stimulate technological development and economic
182
growth. While current tax law attempts to encourage research and
experimentation, it does not adequately incentivize acquisitions of
research efforts by third parties for further experimentation and
product development. To achieve optimal innovation outcomes and
enhanced economic growth, the federal subsidization of research
activities should not be limited to initial research and
experimentation, but should be extended to encourage desirable
innovation acquisitions. One potential option would be to provide
183
an immediate deduction for certain innovation acquisition costs.
178. See generally Michael J. Kennedy, Technology and Emerging Growth Acquisitions:
The Private Perspective, in MICHAEL J. KENNEDY, HANDLING HIGH-TECH M&AS IN A
COOLING MARKET: ENSURING THAT YOU GET VALUE 921, 923–25 (2001) (discussing
the flexibility associated with deals between private and public companies).
179. Specifically, §§ 41, 174, and 1235 of the Code are directed toward innovation
developers. See supra Part III.A (describing the preferential tax treatment associated
with innovation development and transfer).
180. See supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text (outlining the various ways
in which the Code encourages research and development). The Code also
encourages development growth by providing a credit to developers who increase
their research efforts from one year to the next. See I.R.C. § 41 (granting research
credit based on percentage of qualified research costs).
181. See supra notes 106–112 and accompanying text (outlining the flexibility of
capital gains treatment for income associated with patent sales).
182. See supra note 105 (explaining that tax incentives encourage research by
providing immediate deductions and providing investors with benefits even when the
research does not result in a viable innovation).
183. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that allowing immediate deductions for
innovation acquisitions would encourage such acquisitions as well as spur
investment).
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Another option would be to design an optimal depreciation system
for otherwise capitalized innovation acquisition costs that would
184
These options are
incentivize desirable innovation acquisitions.
explored below.
A. Allowing Immediate Expensing of Costs of Acquisitions for Further
Development and Licensing, but not Offensive Use
A company desiring to acquire innovations developed by other
entities may either purchase stock from the third party developing
the innovative technologies or purchase innovation assets
185
separately.
Immediate expensing of (or even depreciation
allowances for) stock purchase costs is unrealistic, as the government
has never been willing to depart from the general capitalization rule
with respect to stock purchases or to allow depreciation deductions
186
for capitalized stock purchase costs. Immediate expensing of direct
184. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the potential use of ex ante rules for acquired
innovation depreciation).
185. An acquiring company could also engage in a tax-free merger with the target
start-up company, issuing its own stock, as opposed to cash, to shareholders of the
target corporation.
See I.R.C. § 368 (defining various types of corporate
reorganizations for tax purposes). In practice, however, taxable stock acquisitions in
which target shareholders emerge with cash are more common.
186. The costs of purchasing stock must be capitalized. I.R.C. § 263. And,
capitalized stock purchase costs are not depreciable under either § 197 or § 167.
I.R.C. § 197(e)(1)(A) (providing stock in a corporation is not a § 197 intangible);
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1 (as amended 1972); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended
2003). Note that there is a special rule whereby a stock purchase will be treated as a
direct asset purchase, entitling the acquirer to depreciation allowances. More
specifically, if the requirements of § 338 are satisfied and if a proper election is made
under that section, a “qualified stock purchase” will be treated as a transaction
involving the acquisition of assets constituting a trade or business (“deemed asset
purchase”). I.R.C. § 338; Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(e)(5). Such a purchase will only be
treated as a deemed asset purchase if the direct acquisition of the assets of the
corporation could have been treated as the acquisition of assets constituting a trade
or business. I.R.C. § 338; Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(e)(5). However, if a taxpayer
purchases stock in a company having substantial innovations but does not make a
§ 338 election, the taxpayer cannot depreciate the purchase costs because stock is
not a § 197 intangible. I.R.C. § 197(e)(1)(A). In other words, if a taxpayer makes a
§ 338 election, the stock purchase will be treated as a purchase of the company’s
innovation assets, the costs of which can be amortized over fifteen years. See id.
§ 197(a) (entitling a taxpayer who purchases a § 197 intangible to a deduction
calculated by amortizing the adjusted basis of the intangible ratably over a fifteenyear period). The quid pro quo for obtaining fifteen-year amortization in a stock
purchase is that the IRS then treats the target as if it had sold its innovation holdings,
which may result in taxable gain. Specifically, in a § 338 qualified stock purchase, the
target corporation is deemed to have engaged in two significant transactions. First,
the IRS treats the target corporation as if it had sold all of its assets in a single
transaction at fair market value at the close of the acquisition date (“deemed sale”).
I.R.C. § 338(a)(1). Second, the IRS treats the target corporation as a new
corporation that purchased, or reacquired, all of the assets the day following the sale
(“deemed purchase”). Id. § 338(a)(2). This deemed purchase of the assets
effectively establishes a cost basis in the target corporation’s assets. As a result, the
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innovation purchase costs, however, should be explored, at least
where consistent with the historical treatment of tangible asset
acquisition costs.
Since 1981, the government has permitted business taxpayers to
elect to deduct immediately the cost of purchasing certain tangible
property that would otherwise have to be capitalized and depreciated
187
over a depreciation schedule. More specifically, § 179 of the Code
allows taxpayers to deduct the cost of any “§ 179 property” in the year
in which the property is placed in service, provided certain conditions
188
To restrict the benefit to relatively small firms with
are met.
moderate investments in qualified assets, the Code establishes two
limitations on the amount that may be deducted: (1) the total cost
189
deducted may not be more than $125,000, and (2) the amount
deducted may not exceed the aggregate income of the taxpayer for
190
the tax year in question.
As mentioned above, the type of property to which the election
191
applies is “section 179 property.” Section 179 property is generally
tangible, depreciable, personal property—as opposed to real
property—that is acquired for use in the active conduct of a trade or
192
business. Common examples of qualified property include business
machines and equipment, transportation equipment, and
193
communications equipment.
As a result of the Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003, off-the-shelf computer

tax consequences of a stock acquisition under § 338 will parallel the tax
consequences of a direct asset acquisition.
187. See I.R.C. § 179 (defining § 179 property as depreciable, tangible, personal
property and off-the-shelf computer software that is purchased for conducting a
trade or business and that satisfies other I.R.C. requirements).
188. See id. § 179(a) (permitting taxpayers to treat the cost of such property as an
expense not chargeable to a capital account and to deduct the expense for the tax
year in which the property is placed in service).
189. The dollar limitation amount applies to tax years from 2006 to 2011. Id.
§ 179(b)(1). This allowance amount is indexed for inflation. The amount is
reduced dollar-for-dollar, not below zero, by the amount by which the cost of the
qualifying property in service during the tax year exceeds $500,000. Id. §179(b)(2).
This allowance amount is also indexed for inflation.
190. Id. § 179(b)(3).
191. Id. § 179(a).
192. Id. § 179(d)(1).
193. Section 179 specifies that qualifying property is depreciable tangible
property used in the active conduct of a trade or business, but it must satisfy the
requirements of § 1245(a)(3), which excludes most buildings and their structural
components. See id. § 179(d)(1); I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3)(B); see also GARY GUENTHER,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SMALL BUSINESS EXPENSING ALLOWANCE: CURRENT STATUS,
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS 2 (2005) (pointing out that research
and bulk storage facilities may be qualified property even though most buildings are
not).
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software was added to the list of “section 179 property.” Other than
readily available software, intangible property has never been
included in the definition. As a result, innovation acquisition costs
have never been eligible for the small business expensing allowance.
Expanding the expense allowance to certain innovation acquisition
costs would represent a significant tax subsidy for innovation
investment and achieve other important goals. Chiefly, it would lower
the cost of capital for innovations used in an active trade or business,
which would reduce the tax burden on innovation acquirers and
stimulate business investment and the economy. Policymakers had
these goals in mind when they enacted special expensing for tangible
195
property, and such objectives are equally applicable with respect to
intangible innovations.
Expanding the expense allowance for limited acquisition costs
would also serve to eliminate high administrative costs and reduce
the harm caused by current irrational tax depreciation rules. It has
been argued that capitalization of costs is warranted only if followed
196
by rational depreciation rules.
As explained earlier, current
depreciation rules for innovation acquisitions adopt a host of
197
arbitrary methods and recovery periods.
Certain innovation
acquisition costs are grouped and depreciated according to an
arbitrary fifteen-year schedule—regardless of their legal or useful
198
life.
Meanwhile, other innovation costs are depreciated according
to an asset-specific schedule—either useful life or as income is
199
earned.
This system is far from rational, and multiple
commentators have pointed to flaws with similar approaches,
supporting the argument that capitalization is not necessarily
200
justified.
194. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 10827, § 202(b), 117 Stat. 752, 757 (2003) (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 179(d)(1)(A)(ii)); see also GUENTHER, supra note 193, at 2–3 (considering the
limitations of expensing allowances and the procedures for recovering the costs of
qualified property).
195. See GUENTHER, supra note 193, at 3–5 (weighing the costs and benefits of
expensing for small businesses).
196. See Yale, supra note 13, at 557–64 (arguing that flawed depreciation
schedules may justify departure from normative capitalization but only in limited
cases; otherwise, expensing may be a preferable neutrality-enhancing policy choice).
197. See supra notes 144–162 (discussing complex depreciation deduction
methods and related statutory provisions).
198. See supra notes 144–151, 163–165 and accompanying text (describing and
criticizing the current depreciation regime for innovations acquired with a business).
199. See supra notes 152–160, 166–170 and accompanying text (describing and
criticizing the current depreciation regime for separately acquired innovations).
200. Some commentators have argued that expensing makes sense when there is
no reason to expect that capitalization and depreciation will promote efficiency. See,
e.g., John W. Lee, Transaction Costs Relating to Acquisition or Enhancement of Intangible
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An expensing option, however, should only be available to
innovations acquired for future development or licensing, and not to
201
innovations acquired for offensive use purposes. The current § 179
expense provision applies only to tangible property “acquired by
202
purchase for use in the active conduct of a trade or business.”
If
the expense allowance is expanded to cover innovation acquisitions,
it should similarly apply to innovations acquired for active use in a
trade or business. Acquisition for licensing purposes should be
203
Acquisition for
considered active use in a trade or business.
offensive use purposes, however, should not.
Offensive use of patent portfolios is typically perpetrated by a
204
The
company without the capacity to generate more innovation.
company is generally not in the business of further research and
development, but rather the company is a shell that holds the patents
205
for litigation purposes. In fact, commentators have noted that the
use of patent portfolios to threaten others through litigation hinders
206
innovation instead of generating it. Patent litigation is prohibitively

Property: A Populist, Political, but Practical Perspective, 22 VA. TAX REV. 273, 345 n.349,
350–52 (2002) (arguing that capitalization followed by slow or no depreciation
distorts economic depreciation and urging that the “second best approach” of
allowing costs that should be capitalized to be deducted immediately “is demanded
by clear reflection of income as a rule of equity or rough justice”); Yale, supra note
13, at 557 n.39 (“‘In the absence of a feasible method of amortizing costs . . . , a
current deduction may be preferable to capitalization as a method of clearly
reflecting income.’” (quoting Alan Gunn, The Requirement That a Capital Expenditure
Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 443, 492–93 (1974))); Case
Comment, An Analysis of INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1505,
1516–19 (1993) (arguing that determinations of whether expenditures should be
treated as capital expenditures should turn on whether current deductibility results
in distortion of income).
201. See supra Part II.B (describing the practice of acquiring innovations for
offensive use purposes).
202. I.R.C. § 179(d)(1)(C).
203. In licensing software and technology, the license itself is the product the
producer offers to its customers. See generally Gomulkiewicz, supra note 100, at 895–
99 (arguing that, though the computer software provides functionality to consumers,
the functionality is worthless without the accompanying license granting use rights).
204. See Jason Ratanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against
Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 160 (2006) (noting
that patent holding companies threaten the market because they “neither develop
new technologies nor participate directly in the market, but instead acquire patent
rights solely for the purpose of obtaining a revenue stream.”).
205. See generally Katherine E. White, Preserving the Patent Process to Incentivize
Innovation in Global Economy, 2006 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 1 (2006),
http://www.law.syr.edu/students/publications/sstlr/framesets/archive/current/cur
rentset.htm (noting that patent holding companies are “patent trolls”—entities that
buy patents and enforce them without any intent to produce a product).
206. Commentators have ventured so far as to call patent holding companies
“‘terrorists’ that ‘threaten legitimate innovators and producers.’” Amy L. Landers,
Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual Property
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costly, particularly in the software industry, in which a single piece of
software may touch on many patents belonging to others, increasing
207
the risk of patent infringements and the possibility of injunction.
Offensive use of patents has been accordingly denounced in the
software industry and others.
B. Setting Rational Economic Depreciation Rules that Would Encourage
Desirable Innovation Acquisitions
If the government is unwilling to depart from normative
capitalization and permit immediate expensing of certain innovation
acquisition costs, as it has done with certain tangible property, then it
should consider designing new ex ante depreciation rules for
208
acquired innovation.
An ideal depreciation system would
incentivize desirable innovation acquisitions, lower compliance and
administrative costs, and measure income with sufficient accuracy.
When designing such a system, a decision would have to be made
about whether to establish a grouping system for innovations—the
209
current approach for all tangible property and intangible property
210
acquired with a business —or to establish an asset-by-asset system,
which is the current approach for intangible property acquired
211
separately.
Ideally, the system would not be a combination of the
two as under current law. A grouping system would be more
administrable than an asset-by-asset depreciation system for
Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 346 (2006) (quoting Jason Schultz, When Dot-Com
Patents Go Bad, SALON.COM, Dec. 13, 2004, http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2004
/12/13/patent_reform/).
207. See Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795, The “Patent Act of
2005”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 7 (2005) (statement of Emery Simon, Counselor,
Business Software Alliance) (“Today, hundreds of patent infringement cases are
pending against computer software and hardware companies, costing the industry
hundreds of millions of dollars each year. . . . Our industry is particularly vulnerable
to such claims because our complex products often have hundreds of patented or
patentable features contained within them.”).
208. The depreciation rules would apply to capitalized innovation acquisition
costs and not stock purchase costs. The Code has a mechanism that treats a stock
purchase as a direct asset purchase. See supra note 186 and accompanying text
(discussing how a qualified stock purchase may be treated as a “deemed asset
purchase” under § 338); see also Matthew A. Melone, Taxable Corporate Acquisitions: A
Primer for Business & the Non-Specialist, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 673, 677–78, 697–703 (1994)
(explaining the application and benefits of making a § 338 election). If such a
mechanism was utilized, the purchase costs could enjoy the benefits of the
depreciation rules recommended here.
209. See I.R.C. § 168 (listing various depreciation methods according to type of
property).
210. See supra notes 144–151, 163–165 and accompanying text (explaining how
grouping system applies to certain acquired innovations).
211. See supra notes 152–160, 166–170 and accompanying text (explaining how an
asset-by-asset approach applies to certain acquired innovations).
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innovation acquisitions. But could a grouping system for innovation
capital be designed to measure income accurately? While grouping
all innovations into a single class with a set recovery period may not
achieve that goal, breaking down innovation into subclasses each with
212
their own depreciation schedule might.
A grouping system currently exists for all depreciable tangible
property. Under § 168 of the Code, enacted in 1981, most
depreciable, tangible, personal property is grouped into one of six
classes with arbitrary recovery periods of either 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, or 20
213
years.
Under this system, for example, computers are classified as
214
The
five-year property and are depreciated over five years.
grouping system for tangible property was enacted to alleviate some
of the problems caused by an asset-by-asset approach—namely the
burden of having to determine the useful life of each tangible asset
and of settling disputes between taxpayers and the government over
useful life determinations. Whether a tangible asset is categorized as
three-year property or five-year property, etc. depends on the asset’s
“class life,” which the government has determined according to
215
industry standards for most forms of tangible property.
212. But see Yale, supra note 13, at 569–72 (arguing that “a grouping system that is
both administrable and sufficiently accurate is an attainable goal for tangible assets”
but “would be more problematic for intangible capital” because intangible capital is
difficult to categorize).
213. I.R.C. § 168(c). Water utility property is placed into its own class and is
recovered over an arbitrary 25 years. Depreciable real property is grouped separately
as well, and is recovered over either 27.5 years (residential apartment buildings) or
39 years (commercial buildings and warehouses). Section 168 was added to the
Code by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201(a), 95
Stat. 172, 203-19 (1981).
214. I.R.C. § 168(c), (e). To find a tangible asset’s applicable grouping (and,
hence, recovery period), one must generally look to § 168(c), § 168(e), and Revenue
Procedure 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674. Section 168(c) provides a table of applicable
recovery periods with reference to the classification of property. Section 168(e) then
provides the classification of property with reference to the “class life” of property.
Finally, Revenue Procedure 87-56 sets forth the class lives of various tangible assets.
Assume, for example, that a taxpayer purchases a large copier to use in her business.
According to Revenue Procedure 87-56, the copier has a class life of six years. See
Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674 § 5 (prescribing class life for computer or
peripheral equipment installed at a business). According to § 168(e), property with
a class life of six years is treated as “5-year” property. See I.R.C. § 168(e) (classifying
property with a class life of more than four but less than ten years as “5-year”
property). And, according to § 168(c), five-year property has an applicable recovery
period of five years. It should be noted that § 168(e) provides the classification of
certain property, making reference to Revenue Procedure 87-56 unnecessary in
many cases. For example, § 168(e)(3)(B) provides that five-year property includes
computers and light general purpose trucks. Seven-year property includes any
property that does not have a class life, among other types of property. I.R.C.
§ 168(e)(3)(C).
215. See supra note 214. Prior to the enactment of § 168 in 1981, the primary
method used to ascertain the useful life for tangible property was the Asset
Depreciation Range (ADR) system. See Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178,
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Accordingly, an effort has been made to achieve some correlation
between the prescribed groupings and the actual economic useful
216
lives of tangible assets.
But the correlation between tax depreciation and economic
depreciation is not perfect for tangible property, and purposefully so.
For tangible property, the government designed a system that is
“accelerated.” Many of the recovery periods for depreciable tangible
217
property are shorter for tax purposes than for economic purposes.
This means that purchasers of tangible property recover their costs
more quickly than economic reality would dictate. Moreover, frontloading of depreciation deductions for many types of tangible
property is permitted, accelerating the largest part of deductions to
218
the earliest years of an asset’s applicable recovery period.
For acquired innovation, short recovery periods, such as three or
five years would incentivize investment in innovation capital. Short
recovery periods would also recognize the relatively risky nature of
innovation compared to other intangible assets. Risk, such as
§ 109, 85 Stat. 497, 508–10 (1971) (providing that class life is an allowance
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury or a delegate based on a reasonable
estimation of the anticipated useful life of the property). Under the ADR system,
effective for tangible assets placed in service after 1970 and before 1981, tangible
assets “were grouped into more than 100 classes, and a guideline life for each class
was determined by the Treasury. Taxpayers could claim a useful life up to twenty
percent longer or shorter than the ADR guideline life.” STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT
OF 1981 67 (Comm. Print 1981). The ADR system did not resolve all problems, and
§ 168 was enacted in response, grouping tangible assets according to each asset’s
class life. An asset’s class life is the midpoint life in the original ADR. Rev. Proc. 8756, 1987-2 C.B. 674.
216. Professor Jeff Strnad describes these efforts:
The current tax depreciation treatment of [tangible] assets depends heavily
on their class lives. . . . Not surprisingly, the Treasury Department’s ultimate
goal in studying depreciation for each asset is to determine an appropriate
class life for the asset. In particular, Congress has mandated that the
Treasury Department study the actual depreciation history of assets so that
Treasury might propose revisions to existing class lives and might propose
class lives for assets that currently have none. The legislative history
concerning this mandate includes the following directive to Treasury about
how class lives are to be calculated: “Class lives . . . [should] be determined
such that the present value of straight-line depreciation deductions over the
class life, discounted at an appropriate real rate of interest, is equal to the
present value of what the estimated decline in value of the asset would be in
the absence of inflation.” Treasury has termed the class life that emerges
from this type of calculation the “equivalent economic life” of the asset.
Tax Depreciation and Risk, 52 SMU L. REV. 547, 567 (1999) (quoting STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1986, H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at 103 (1986) (Conf. Rep.)).
217. See I.R.C. § 168(c), (e) (classifying, for example, property with a class life of
more than five year but less than ten years as five-year property).
218. See I.R.C. § 168(b) (prescribing depreciation methods according to type of
property).
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retirement risk and revenue risk, “can have a significant impact on
219
the optimal design of depreciation rules.” As some economists have
argued, “depreciation schedules for relatively risky assets should be
accelerated to compensate the owners of such assets for bearing a
220
disproportionably large share of the capital price risk.”
It is often
difficult to determine whether certain acquired innovation will
221
produce benefits and, if so, how long benefits will last.
For
example, if a purchaser acquires innovation at an early stage when
patent applications for the innovation are pending, the purchaser
cannot be certain about whether all of the patent applications will
222
In addition, even after the purchaser receives
mature to patents.
the patents, there is always a fear that the patents may be invalidated
223
subsequently by a third party.
One might try to argue that longer recovery periods are justified
due to the fact that current ex post adjustments are available to
innovation owners upon later sale or retirement of purchased
innovations. It is true that innovation owners may take a tax loss
deduction on either the sale or retirement of innovations. The
deductible amount on sale is the excess of the adjusted basis in the
224
innovation over the amount realized in the trade,
and the
deductible amount on retirement or obsolescence is the unrecovered
225
adjusted basis in the innovation.
But ex ante slow depreciation
219. See Strnad, supra note 216, at 547–48 (noting that “retirement risk must be
taken into account in designing an accelerated schedule that does not favor some
assets over others”).
220. Yale, supra note 13, at 572 (citing Jeremy I. Bulow & Lawrence H. Summers,
The Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 20, 37–38 (1984)); see Roger H. Gordon
& John Douglas Wilson, Measuring the Efficiency Cost of Taxing Risky Capital Income, 79
AM. ECON. REV. 427, 438 (1989).
221. See generally Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Comm’r, 355 F.3d 997, 998 (7th Cir.
2004) (holding that the purchaser of a patent subject to a large judgment rendered
in a patent infringement case pending at the time of purchase has no right to deduct
the cost as a business expense).
222. See, e.g., Meehan v. PPG Indus., 802 F.2d 881, 885–86 (7th Cir. 1986)
(demonstrating that an innovation acquirer risks having a court declare that the
transaction between the acquirer and the seller was illegal). In Meehan, the plaintiff
had patent applications pending, subject to an exclusive licensing arrangement, and
also expected patents to be issued in a number of countries. Id. at 882. The Seventh
Circuit held that the agreement was illegal per se because the agreement, in
anticipation of patent protection, extended the grant beyond the legal life of the
patent. Id. at 885–86.
223. See Sharon A. Israel & Jason W. Cook, Preparing Patent Invalidity Opinions, in
PREPARING PATENT LEGAL OPINIONS 169, 193 (2002) (stating that ultimately invalidity
opinion letters must determine whether the patent at issue is invalid based on
grounds such as “anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, obviousness under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103, or a violation of the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (best mode, enablement,
written description, definiteness)”).
224. I.R.C. § 1001.
225. Id.; I.R.C. § 165.
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schedules (long recovery periods) with substantial ex post
adjustments are not necessarily favored over ex ante accelerated
depreciation schedules (short recovery periods) with fewer ex post
adjustments.
As noted by one commentator, “an accelerated
depreciation system . . . reduces strategic loss-taking. Under an
accelerated schedule adjusted basis is lower at any given point in
time. It is less likely that adjusted basis will ever exceed market value
by enough to make strategic loss-taking profitable net of trading
226
costs.”
In sum, as an alternative to expensing, tax policy makers could
consider creating arbitrary depreciation conventions and methods
for recovering capitalized costs of acquiring innovation and, more
importantly, provide artificially low recovery periods (three-, five-,
and seven-year recovery periods). Congress has already taken this
approach for at least two forms of acquired intellectual property:
computer software and copyrights on musical works. In 1993,
Congress created an arbitrary three-year depreciation period for
capitalized costs of separately acquired software (software that is not
227
In 2005,
acquired as part of the purchase of a trade or business).
Congress created a special depreciation rule for musical
228
Under this new
compositions and copyrights on musical works.
rule, taxpayers may elect to depreciate the costs of acquiring
“applicable musical property” over five years in lieu of amortizing the
229
The term “applicable
costs under the income forecast method.
musical property” means any musical composition (including any
accompanying words), or any copyright with respect to a musical
230
These new rules have the benefit of encouraging
composition.
226. Strnad, supra note 216, at 597.
227. See I.R.C. § 197(e)(3)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(c)(4) (excluding computer
software readily available to the general public); see also I.R.C. § 167(f)
(incorporating definition of computer software from § 197(e)(3)(B)); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.167(a)-14(b) (explaining how to determine the deduction amount for computer
software).
228. I.R.C. § 167(g)(8).
229. Id. § 167(g)(8)(A) (as amended by the Tax Increase Prevention and
Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, 120 Stat. 345 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)). Under § 167(g)(8)(A), if an election is in effect,
then any expense paid or incurred by the taxpayer in acquiring qualified musical
property that is placed in service during the taxable year may be amortized ratably
over the five-year period beginning the month that the property was placed in
service. Id. The Treasury Department is responsible for prescribing the time and
form of election; the election applies to any applicable musical property placed in
service during the taxable year the election is made. Id. § 167(g)(8)(D).
230. Id. § 167(g)(8)(c). This special depreciation rule for musical works applies
with respect to property placed in service in taxable years beginning after December
31, 2005; an election may not be made for any tax year beginning after December 31,
2010. Id.
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investment in computer software and musical compositions. In
addition, the new rules simplify tax accounting and minimize the cost
of tax compliance. Similar goals could be achieved with capitalized
innovation acquisition costs.
CONCLUSION
A robust innovation acquisition market fosters desirable innovation
development at the lower strata, comprised mostly of small entities
and research universities. Accordingly, it is important to have sound
tax rules that encourage acquisitions of innovation for societal good
and, at the same time, achieve important tax policy goals such as
efficiency and administrability. There are several ways in which to
incentivize desirable acquisitions. Tax breaks are currently offered to
inventors and other transferors of innovation. Adequate economic
tax incentives also could be offered to innovation purchasers to
achieve optimal innovation outcomes and enhanced economic
growth. Any incentives, however, should not apply to acquisitions of
innovation for offensive use purposes, because they would only serve
to hinder further innovation.

